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I. JURISDICTION STATEMENT
This is an appeal pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 stemming from the
Fourth District Court, Millard County, State of Utah, regarding the Court's final Orders
regarding the Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment on or about
April 21, 2010, R. p. 4896-4980; the Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Alter on or
about September 13, 2010, R. p. 5261-5285; and the Memorandum Decision denying the Motion
to Alter on or about November 8, 2010, R. p. 5319-5323.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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1. The above named Appellant, Michael Anthony Archuleta, ("Michael"), was charged with
capital criminal homicide for the November 22, 1988 murder of Gordon Church
("Church"). Addendum, Third Amended Information as Exhibit "1."
2. The case proceeded to trial and Michael was represented during the trial by attorney
Michael Esplin ("Esplin").
3. At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, Michael was convicted of criminal
homicide, a capital offense.
4. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of the trial, the death penalty was imposed. Id.
Warrant of Death as Exhibit "2."
5. Michael then appealed his conviction and sentence and was again represented by Esplin
during the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence.
6. The Utah Supreme Court denied Michael's appeal of his conviction and sentence on or
about March 25, 1993. Id. State vs. Archuleta, 850 P. 2d 1232 (1993) as Exhibit "3."
7. Michael then filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, challenging his conviction on the ground that he had been denied his Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt and
penalty phases of his trial, as well as on the direct appeal of the conviction. R. p.04,
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
8. Attorney Karen Chaney, representing Michael pro bono, filed an Amended Petition for
Post Conviction Relief on or about August 11, 1994. R. p. 75, Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief.
9. Eventually, in response to Michael's Amended Petition the State moved for summary
judgment. R. p.297.
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10. After arguments, Judge Davis, District Court Judge granted the State's motion for
summary judgment holding, inter alia, that the claims argued in Michael's petition were
available to him during the direct appeal; consequently, Michael, having failed to raise
them on direct appeal, was procedurally barred from raising them in his Petition for Post
Conviction Relief. R. p. 546, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
11. On or about June 26, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court overturned Judge Davis' judgment ir.
the District Court without much discussion but referencing three cases, and remanded the
case back to the District Court for further proceedings. Addendum, Archuleta vs.
Galetka, 960 P. 2d 399 (1998) as Exhibit "7."
12. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (1990), one of the three cases cited by the Court in
overturning Judge Davis's ruling, held that a conviction may be collaterally attacked even
if the issue was available on appeal if the Appellant can establish unusual circumstances.
When the trial attorney is the same attorney involved in the appeal, defenses such as
ineffective assistance of counsel are not waived if not asserted on appeal and thus may be
pursued in a post conviction relief petition. Id. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P. 2d 873 (1990) as
Exhibit "8."
13. Attorney Karen Chaney's license to practice pro hoc vice was revoked because of a
mental breakdown, thus ending her representation of Michael. See, R. p. 725-726, June 7,
2001 Ruling and Order; R. p.706, February 13, 2001 Ruling on Motion; R.p.622,
September 8, 2000 Motion for Extension; and R. p.635, September 20, 2000 Hearing
Minutes regarding Motion.
14. Attorney Edward Brass ("Brass") was then appointed as new counsel for Michael on or
about June 30, 1999. R. p. 728
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15. Brass then filed Michael's Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief ("Second
Amended Petition"), which was essentially identical in many aspects to the First
Amended Petition, on or about June 14, 2002, in the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Millard County. R. p. 888, Second Amended Petition.
16. The State of Utah, in response to the Second Amended Petition, again moved for
summary judgment on or about April 1, 2003. R. p. 1255.
17. A year later, the State moved for rule 11 sanctions against Brass on or about April 12,
2004. R. p. 1986.
18. On August 25, 2004, the Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on all claims
except 33(d)-(t) and 35 (o)-(z), finding that claims 1-30 were procedurally barred
pursuant to Judge Davis5 previous order. R p. 2226, Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment.
19. On March 21 and 22 and on May 17 and 18, 2006, the Trial Court conducted an
evidentiary hearing where Ed Brass presented expert testimony alleging trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present mitigating factors during the penalty phase of the trial.
See R. p 2753, 2791, 2793, 2891 (transcript), and 2907 (transcript).
20. The Parties then submitted closing arguments on September 14, 2006 and October 31,
2006. See, R p. 2990, 3009.
21. On or about January 22, 2007, Judge Eyre, after taking evidence and closing arguments
on the mitigation issue, denied the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief holding that
mitigating evidence presented at the hearing contradicted the trial counsel's trial strategy,
as well as Michael's own testimony that he did not inflict any of the injuries to Gordon
Church. R. p. 3338, Ruling on Petition.
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22. On or about March 9, 2007, the Appellant appealed the decisions of the Court regarding
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is pending before the Court. R p.
3402.
23. The undersigned was appointed as counsel for Michael, and submitted a Motion to Set
Aside Judge' Eyre's August 25, 2004 and January 22, 2007 Judgments and Motion for a
New Trial on or about July 17, 2009. R p. 3505-3562.
24. Judge Eyre issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment
on or about April 21, 2010. R p. 4896-4980.
25. Appellant filed his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on or about May 4, 2010. R p.
995-5004.
26. A Memorandum Decision was filed denying the Motion to Alter on or about September
13,2010. R. p.5261-5285.
27 Appellant filed his Notice to Appeal on or about September 20, 2010. R p.5289-5290.
28. Appellant filed his Second Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on or about September
23, 2010. R. p. 5291-5292.
29. A Memorandum Decision was filed on or about November 8, 2010, R. p.5319-5323,
denying the Second Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The findings of fact found in the Utah Supreme Court's mandatory appeal, "Archuleta I,"
Addendum as Exhibit "3"; Judge Davis' order granting summary judgment, R 546; Judge Eyre's
order granting summary judgment, R 2226; and Judge Eyre's denial of post-conviction relief, R.
3338, adequately for the purpose of this appeal, provides a summary of the factual matters before
the Court. As such, a factual summary will not be further provided herein.
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IV.
I.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES/ PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

Whether Michael is entitled to the relief sought in his Motion to Set Aside the
Trial Judge's August 25, 2004 and January 22, 2007 rulings and judgments and/or his
Motion for New Trial.
II.

Whether or not the trial judge applied the correct standard^ in addressing Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside.

III.

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment by allowing him to conduct discovery to address the Rule 60 Motion
to Set Aside.

IV.

Whether or not Michael's mistaken reliance on Brass to properly investigate and pursue
his post-conviction petition justifies relief from the Judge pyre's August 25, 2004 and
January 22, 2007 rulings and judgments.

V.

Whether or not Brass provided ineffective assistance of counsel or was grossly negligent
by failing to investigate, pursue and present the following claims regarding the
Appellant's Post-Conviction Relief:
1. Issues regarding Wood's confession to Jorgensen.
2. Issues regarding David Homer's testimony.
3. Issues regarding the failure to contact Gary Hawkins and others regarding
subsequent confessions of Lance Wood.
4. Issues regarding whether Michael is exempt from the death penalty as provided
for by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) andjUtah Code §77-15a-101.
5. Issues regarding Esplin's failure to produce evidence regarding Mr. Wood's
personality and psychological assessments.
6. Issues regarding Esplin's failure to obtain Experts !to support Michael's defense
against the State's charges.
7. Issues regarding the mental breakdown of the State's forensic pathologist.
8. Issues regarding Brass' failure to amend the pleadings.

VI.

Whether Brass prejudiced Michael by introducing prejudibial, rather than mitigating
evidence in his Post-Conviction Relief Petition.
9

VII.

Whether "cumulative error" undermines any confidence that that Michael received a fair
trial or competent representation regarding post-conviction matters; therefore entitling
Michael to a new trial and/or penalty phase of his trial.

VIII.

Whether or not the death sentence should be outright reversed based upon a lack of
confidence that that Michael received a fair trial or competent representation regarding
post-conviction matters.

IX.

Whether or not Michael has exhausted his State remedies.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief challenging his conviction and

sentence alleging numerous claims that during his criminal trial, his rights as guaranteed by
Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States were violated. Pursuant to the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment and without fully addressing Michael's substantive claims and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Trial Court on August 25, 2004, R. p.2226, and on January 22, 2007, R. p.
338, dismissed Michael's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Appellant then filed a Motion to
Set Aside Judge Eyre's ruling based upon excusable neglect, gross negligence and in ineffective
assistance of counsel The Trial Court denied the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. For the
reasons stated herein, the Trial Court erred in its conclusions and applied the wrong standard in
reaching its conclusions. This Court should grant the Appellant his relief by granting him a new
trial and/or sentencing in that the evidence supports Michael's claims; or in the alternative, this
Court should remand the case to the district court for the purpose of addressing the Appellant's
claims using the proper criteria and standards as indicated herein.
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VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. This Court Should Set Aside the Judgments of the District Court Pursuant to Rule
60(b)
1. Introduction
In this matter, Michael sought an order setting aside the Trial Court's August 25, 2004
and January 22, 2007 rulings denying Michael's post-conviction petition. In determining
whether this motion should be granted, this Court
must not lose sight of the fact that the case before us is a post-conviction petition seeking
habeas corpus relief from a death penalty sentence. A post-conviction proceeding is a
proceeding of constitutional importance, over which the judiciary has supervisory
responsibilities due to our constitutional role. In discharging this role, we must recognize
the stakes involved in post-conviction proceedings, take appropriate steps to satisfy
ourselves of the reliability of convictions and death sentences, and ensure that a
petitioner's fundamental rights are adequately protected.
Memies v. Galetka, 150 P. 3d 480, 503 (2006).
Motions to set aside are allowed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides
as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reason[ ] (1),... not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. . . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
[Emphasis added.]
For the reasons found herein, Michael is entitled to have Judge Eyre's ruling denying
Post-conviction Relief set aside pursuant to Rule 60 (b). It is important to note that the Appellant
is seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) based on three alternative grounds: 1) mistake,
inadvertences, surprise or excusable neglect; 2) counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel; and 3) counsel was grossly negligent. As the following demonstrates, the Appellant is
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entitled to relief on all three grounds justifying relief from Judge Eyre's ruling denying postconviction relief.
2. The Trial Court Applied the Wrong Standard in Determining Whether Michael
was entitled to Rule 60 Relief
To obtain relief from a judgment or an order, Rule 60 requires the person to pursue the
relief by Motion. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7
states that an "application to the court for an order shall be by motion which . . . shall be made
in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought." [Emphasis added.] Rule 7
continues by providing that "motions . . . shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum."
Rule 7 (c)(1). Then Rule 7 sets up a briefing schedule to properly bring the issue before the
Court for its ruling. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) mandates the content the memorandum supporting the
motion should contain. Although the language of paragraph 7(c)(3)(A) seems to be specific to
the content necessary for a Motion for Summary judgment, the rule, as stated and quoted above,
also states that all motions must comply with Rule 7. If the "content" requirements of Rule 7
apply, then the memorandum should "contain a statement of material facts . . . which shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits
or discovery materials." In fact, Rule 7 contemplates that any fact not "controverted by the
responding party" is "deemed admitted." Id. The Rule then mandates that after the briefing has
been submitted, then the matter is to be submitted to the Court and the Court at that point may
conduct a hearing. See, Rule 7(d) and (e). The Court may then schedule a hearing to allow the
parties to make oral arguments or to allow presentation of evidence regarding facts which are
disputed. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 43 provides that upon a motion "based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective
12

parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions."
In analyzing whether the Trial Court was in error, this Court should be mindful of the
posture of the case and the issues that were before the Trial Court. The Appellant initiated this
action by filing a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The State sought and obtained summary
judgment for every claim found in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with the single
exception being the claim regarding whether or not trial counsel provided adequate mitigating
investigation. R. p. 2226. Mr. Brass without any legal justification and without Appellant's
authority failed to provide responses to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment essentially all
of the Appellant's arguments, which resulted in default on virtually all of the Appellant's claims
found in his Petition. R. p. 1600 and 2226. In this matter, the Appellant filed a Rule 60(b)
Motion for Relief from Judge Eyre's two rulings, August 25, 2004 and January 22, 2007, based
upon Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel and gross negligence in allowing default judgment.
This Rule 60(b) Motion complied with Rule 7 in all respects by containing evidentiary support
for many of the claims which Brass allowed to be dismissed by summary judgment. In this
Motion, the Appellant complied with Rule 7 by clearly and succinctly stating the facts upon
which he relied, and then supported these facts by affidavits and by citations from sworn
testimony found in the record. The Respondent did not dispute the facts nor did hefileany
counter-affidavits creating any facts in controversy. The Respondent did not argue, nor did the
Trial Court find, that the Appellant failed to comply with the rules of civil practice regarding
presenting a proper motion before the Court. The State essentially filed no competing affidavits
to the Appellant's factual allegations, nor did it request leave of the Court to pursue discovery or
to dispute the evidence presented in support of the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. The
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Respondent did not request a hearing pursuant to Rule 7 or Rule 43, nor did the Court set an
evidentiary hearing. In essence, the Rule 60(b) Motion never went past the motion stage. Upon
Michael's presentation of the evidence supporting his Rule 60 Motion, the State had the burden
to contradict the Michael's evidence supporting his Rule 60 Motion. Since the State failed to
object or contradict the evidence, the Trial Court, thus this Court, should consider the evidence
the Appellant presented as admitted and true.
In support of his Rule 60 Motion, Michael presented his affidavit, in which the affidavit
of Mr. Brass concurred and which the state did not dispute, that he never requested or otherwise
authorized Mr. Brass not to pursue the issues raised in his petition for post-conviction relief. See
Affidavit of Michael Archuleta, Addendum, Exhibit "29," R. p. 5032-5046, and Ed Brass,
Addendum, Exhibit "15," R. p. 5057-5226.
Instead of disputing Appellant's factual allegations properly submitted in support of his
motions, the Respondent's Opposition to the Appellant's Motion for Rule 60 relief argued that
Appellant must "prove prior post-convictions counsel's ineffectiveness before he would be
entitled to rule 60(b) relief," R. p. 4648-4751 Respondent's Opposition p. 7. In addition,
Respondent's Opposition states that Menzies "makes clear that Archuleta had to prove that prior
post-conviction counsels were ineffective before the Court could grant relief." Id, Respondent's
Opposition p. 2 There is no support for this position in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding motion practice.
The Respondent's reasoning and the Trial Court's rulings were in error in that they
confused the proof and the necessary analysis required regarding a Post Conviction Relief
Petition with the proof and analysis required regarding whether or not Appellant's Rule 60
Motion should be granted. Clearly, relief pursuant to a Post-Conviction Relief Petition can be

14

based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, relief pursuant to the Rule
60 Motion can also be based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The analysis and standard
of ineffective assistance of counsel in these two actions are completely separate and distinct.
The focus of the Trial Court on the issue of whether or not Michael received ineffective
assistance of counsel as it relates to his Rule 60 motion for relief should have been on whether or
not Mr. Brass failed to investigate and pursue viable claims to obtain Post-Conviction Relief,
not whether or not the claims raised "proved" that Michael was entitled to post-conviction relief
In fact the Trial Court held as follows:
Based upon the approach employed by the Supreme Court in assessing the Rule 60(b)
motion in the Memies case, it is the Court's considered view that the burden of proof
applicable to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims is more
than simply a pleading standard. Instead, it requires Petitioner to apply the Strickland
standard and demonstrate, with respect to each of his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, that Brass' representation was objectively deficient and that, but for Brass'
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Petitioner's
post-conviction proceeding would have been different.
R. p. 4896, at p. 38.
In analyzing the issues, it is essential to keep in mind the posture of the case. The
Appellant had filed a "motion" with appropriate supporting documents taking the position that
the Trial Court's summary judgment should be set aside. Memies Court stated, with regard to a
district court's review of a Rule 60(b) motion, as follows:
It is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of the
equitable nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its discretion in
favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.
Memies v. Galetka, 150P.3d480, (Utah 2006), quotingMusselman, 667P.2dat 1055-56.
The Memies Court also took the opportunity to remind trial courts that "the law should
not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the [plaintiff] should be
without remedy." Id. at 503, quoting Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). This
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Court instructed district courts that while they do have discretion in determining Rule 60(b)
motions that their "discretion is tempered by the fact that the rule is designed to be remedial and
must be liberally applied." Id.
The burden imposed by the Trial Court in this matter exceeds what is required by a Rule
60(b) Motion and the other civil rules as they relate to motion practice. In other words, to be
entitled to Rule 60(b) relief, Michael simply needs to present viable claims, properly supported,
as Rule 7 requires, that if proven would allow him to ultimately prevail. Memies supports this
assertion when it held that "[e]ven 'general denials' that would allow a litigant to prevail if
proven are sufficient," and when it stated that "[w]hile the record is far from fully developed
with regard to Menzie's claims..., [he] is not required to prove any of his claims or meet an
evidentiary threshold in order to demonstrate his claims have merit." Id. at 518, quoting
Erickson, 882 P 2d at 1149. Furthermore, this Court declared that a litigant seeking rule 60(b)
relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel or gross negligence only "must proffer some
defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial on the issue thus raised " Id.
at 517 quoting Downey State Bank v. Major-BIakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976).
The Court expressly recognized that proof at this posture "does not set an overly
burdensome threshold.. " id., and expounded that, in seeking relief under Rule 60(b), "where a
party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would [warrant relief] by
the claimant... it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense." Id. at 17
(emphasis added), quoting Lund, 2000 UT 75, \ 29, 11 P.3d 277. The threshold requirement is
whether or not the Appellant has alleged in his Rule 60 Motion that he has "meritorious" claims
regarding the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief of which Brass was ineffective or grossly
negligent in investigating and pursing. The Trial Court erred by obligating the Appellant to
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establish proof that the claims he presented in his Rule 60(b) motion proved he was entitled to
post-conviction relief.
The Trial Court in the present case was critical of Appellant for not conducting discovery
to prove that he was entitled to post-conviction relief See, R p. 5261-5285, Memorandum
Decision beginning at Section C. The Court held that the Appellant should have known pursuant
to Menzies that discovery was available. However, Menzies supports the proposition that
discovery is available after the court grants the Rule 60(b) Motion, but not the position that
discovery should be conducted to "prove" he is entitled to post-conviction relief at the motion
stage. Discovery in Menzies was conducted while the Trial Court was considering the PostConviction Petition not when it was considering the Rule 60 Motion. See, Menzies at p. 518520. In Menzies, after default and after the Rule 60 motion, the focus shifted to Mr. Brass'
actions regarding the investigation and pursuit of the post-conviction petition. After Menzies
filed his Rule 60 Motion with the appropriate affidavits, the State disputed the facts regarding
Brass5 ineffective assistance of counsel in pursing the petition for post-conviction relief and
sought discovery to defend against the Rule 60 Motion. Id at para. 44. Based upon the State's
Motion, the Court then set an evidentiary hearing, apparently by the authority found in Rule 43,
"in order to obtain evidence relating to communications between Brass and Menzies during the
period of Brass' representation." Id. A hearing was for the singular purpose of addressing Mr.
Brass' action in pursuing Mr. Menzies' post-conviction relief so that the court could address the
Rule 60(b) Motion, not whether Mr. Menzies could prove there were claims which "proved" that
he was entitled to post-conviction relief. In the case-in-hand, the State did not dispute any of the
Appellant's factual allegations, failed to seek discovery and failed to request an evidentiary
hearing. Thus, the Trial Court was obligated to accept the evidence Michael presented as true.
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The Appellant's evidence clearly supported the proposition that Brass provided ineffective
assistance of counsel and/or was grossly negligent in allowing default and in pursuing any and
all viable claims that Michael had regarding his post-conviction action.
The Appellant's Rule 60 Motion requested that the Trial Court's judgments granting
summary judgment, mostly by default, be opened so that he could pursue viable claims that Mr.
Brass failed to pursue or investigate. The evidence provided was simply to demonstrate there
was support for the claims that Brass allowed to be dismissed by summary judgment. The
Appellant, at this posture of the case, clearly supported the proposition, thus proved, that Mr.
Brass was grossly negligent or provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to pursue
viable claims for post-conviction relief.
The Appellant certainly has established from the existing record that these claims should
have been explored but were not. Accordingly, this Court should grant the Appellant relief from
Judge Eyre's summary judgment rulings as indicated herein
3. The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Rule 59 Motion
In response to the Trial Court's ruling denying his Rule 60(b) Motion, on May 3, 2010,
the Appellant filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 59 asking the Court to allow him to pursue
discovery and also requested an evidentiary hearing to address the Rule 60 (b) Motion. R. 49884989. This motion was supported by the affidavit of James K. Slavens, Esq. R. p. 4990. The
Appellant based this request to supplement the evidence through discovery because, as provided
in the previous section, the Trial Court had assessed the Appellant the burden of "proving" that
he was entitled to post-conviction relief in determining whether or not the Rule 60(b) Motion to
Set Aside should be granted. The Court denied the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion. R. p. 5261. As
the following demonstrates, the Trial Court's denial of his Rule 59 ruling was in error.
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 allows for a party to move the Court to alter or amend
the judgment when it is necessary to take additional testimony or where there is newly
discovered evidence, so long as the motion is filed no later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment. The Appellant's motion clearly complied with the time requirements of Rule 59.
Michael's July 2009 Motion to Set Aside focused on claims that his previous attorney, Ed Brass,
provided ineffective assistance of counsel on behalf of the Appellant for the reasons stated in the
Motion. As provided previously herein, the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside was based, significantly, on the fact that Michael had not conducted discovery.
Particularly, the Trial Court made the finding that "[Appellant] provides the Court with no
evidence concerning the actual extent of Brass's investigation on these issues. Nor has Petitioner
shown that Brass did not, in fact, investigate what Wood now attests to in his affidavit. Without
this evidence, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that Brass performed deficiently." R. p.
4896, Memorandum Decision, p. 50. The Court found similarly as to each of the points raised in
the July Motion to Set Aside. See generally, Id.
However, the explanation for the lack of any statements by Brass with regard to his
investigation of the relevant issues in this matter was simple: Brass refused to provide any
information. The undersigned left several messages for Mr. Brass requesting that Brass discuss
with him his position on each of the issues that were raised in Michael's July 2009 Motion to Set
Aside. However, Mr. Brass never returned any of those calls. R. 4990-4994, Affidavit of James
K. Slovens, para. 15. The Federal Public Defender's Office also attempted to contact Brass to
determine his position regarding the issues raised in Appellant's Motion. Id. at 17. Again, Brass
refused to return any calls. Id. at para. 16. In fact, after the Court's ruling denying the
Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion, Appellant's counsel again attempted to contact Mr. Brass, and

19

again with no success. Id. at para. 18. Finally, the Appellant was able to obtain an affidavit
from Mr. Brass, which was filed on August 4, 2010, which conclusively answered the Trial
Court's question regarding the "actual extent of Brass' investigation on these issues." The
Appellant established that Brass had failed to investigate and pursue Michael's claims. R. p.
5057, Addendum, Exhibit "15."
Regarding the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion, the Trial Court held that "[nevertheless, even
excusing and considering Brass's affidavit, Petitioner still has not shown that the Rule 60 (b)
proceedings should be reopened." R. p. 5261, at p. 15. The Trial Court also denied the
Appellant's request that he be allowed to pursue discovery: "because ordinary prudence would
have guarded against Petitioner's misapprehension that compulsory discovery could be used to
obtain evidence in support of a Rule 60 (b) motion, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks under
Rule 59 based upon surprise." R. p. 5261, at p. 20. Implied in the Trial Court's rulings is that the
Court did grant the Rule 59 Motion to the point of at least admitting Mr. Brass' and Michael's
Affidavits. See also, R. p. 5253, wherein the Trial Court denied the Respondent's Motion to
Strike Mr. Brass' Affidavit.
First, the Trial Court should have granted the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion for the reasons
that are contained herein. Second, as the following demonstrates, the Trial Court should have
granted the Appellant's Rule 60 Motion based upon the additional information provided in Mr.
Brass' and Michael's Affidavits and considered by the Trial Court regarding the Rule 59
Motion. 1

1 To understand the Trial Court's ruling as references to the Claim number, the Appellant had
the following claims: (1) Brass failed to fully explore and present a claim under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) in relation to Lance Wood's confessions or, in the alternative,
failed to investigate trial counsel's ineffective assistance in relation to Wood's confession; (2)
Brass failed to properly investigate, pursue, and present evidence indicating that witness David
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Considering Mr. Brass' Affidavit, the Trial Court found as follows:
With respect to claim 1 concerning Brass's alleged failure to investigate Lance Wood's
"confession," claim 2 concerning Brass's failure to raise a Brady claim, a newly
discovered evidence claim, and a suppression of evidence claim in relation to David
Homer's alleged recantation, and claim 3 concerning Brass's alleged failure to investigate
statements made by Gary Hawkins in relation to Wood's participation in the homicide of
Church, even if Brass's affidavit shows that his performance was professionally deficient,
the Court independently determined with respect to each of these claims that Petitioner
had failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. See April 21, 2010
Mem. Decision at 50-51, 53-54, and 57-60. Thus, the facts alleged in Brass's affidavit
would not have altered the Court's decision on these Rule 60(b) claims.
R. p. 5261 at p. 16.
The Trial Court's ruling, even if it is correct that the Appellant has the burden of
"proving" that he is entitled to post-conviction relief before his Rule 60 (b) motion could be
granted, simply ignores the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Sears. See Discussion
found in Section A6, which follows.
As to Claim four, the Trial Court, citing on Jacobs v. State, 20 P.2d 382 (2001), ruled that
Mr. Brass reasonably relied upon Dr. Gummow and Dr. Cunningham in not pursuing an Atkins'
claim. R. p. 5253, p. at 16-17. Regarding this issue, Mr. Brass stated in his affidavit that "I did
not recall asking for their evaluation regarding the issue of whether or not Michael Archuleta
Homer recanted his testimony; (3) Brass failed to properly investigate, pursue, and present
evidence concerning the testimony of Gary Hawkins; (4) Brass failed to properly investigate,
pursue, and present evidence concerning a claim of exemption from the death penalty on the
basis of mental retardation; (5) Brass failed to properly challenge trial counsel's representation
on the ground that trial counsel did not call an expert to compare the psychological profiles of
Petitioner and Wood; (6) Brass failed to properly challenge trial counsel's representation on the
ground that trial counsel did not retain a blood spatter expert, an expert to testify that Church was
dead or had lost consciousness prior to any torture or abuse, or an expert to testify that the
battery cables used against Church would not have produced a significant electrical shock; (7)
Brass failed to properly investigate, pursue, and present evidence that the State committed a
Brady violation in failing to reveal that Martha Kerr, a Forensic Pathologist for the Utah State
Crime Lab who testified for the State concerning blood evidence, suffered a mental breakdown
prior to her testimony; (8) Brass failed to amend the second amended petition to include claims 1
through 30 that were previously, but erroneously, denied by the Court as procedurally barred;
and (9) Brass prejudiced Petitioner during the post-conviction mitigation case by presenting
evidence that was more harmful than helpful.
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suffered from mental retardation. Rather, we directed the experts, who are both well experienced
in capital litigation, to investigate any and all possible mental health defenses for Mr. Archuleta."
Addendum, Exhibit "15," R. p. 5057 at para. 17(c). As the Trial Court recognized, Jacobs stands
for the proposition that an attorney can reasonably rely on experts' "conclusions." However, in
Jacobs, experts were actually retained during the criminal trial to address the competency of the
Defendant. Id. at para. 4. That is not the case in this situation. Neither Esplin, Michael's
criminal trial attorney, nor Brass retained an expert for the specific purpose of addressing
whether or not Michael suffers from mental retardation. This is quite different than the facts of
Jacobs.
In Jacobs, experts were actually retained for the purpose of determining Jacobs'
competency. The fact of the matter is, Brass was the attorney and had the obligation to
investigate and pursue viable claims, not to just send the case to an expert with instructions to
"tell me what defenses may be available." An attorney cannot satisfy his obligations by simply
asking an expert, not even an expert relating to mental retardation, to evaluate his/her client and
report what legal claims should be pursued based upon that evaluation. Mr. Brass had the
obligation to pursue and/or eliminate whether or not Atkins provided a viable claim.
As to Claim 5, the Court ruled that "[w]ithout a definitive showing that a comparison of
Petitioner's and Wood's psychological profiles constitutes evidence contradicting the State's
theory of the case, Brass's affidavit simply does not show that his performance in representing
Petitioner in this respect was deficient." R. p. 5261 at p. 18. The Court continued by arguing
that even if Brass' performance was deficient, Michael failed to establish that he was prejudiced.
Id. Again, without restating in detail the Appellant's argument, the standard of proof, in light of
Sears and the cases cited herein, was too stringent. Michael "might be prejudiced by his
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counsel's failures" to have consulted an expert in order to determine whether or not the claim
should have been pursued.
As to Claim 6, first, the Trial Court held that Brass was not obligated to pursue "claims
that were procedurally barred under the PCRA." Id. at p. 19. For the reasons stated in the
Appellant's initial Appellant's Brief and in Section 8 below, starting on page 69, Claim 6 is not
procedurally barred. Second, the Trial Court held that "Petitioner had to show that trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to hire the foregoing experts." Id. at 19. Again, this ruling applied an
inappropriate burden and is contrary to Sears where it held that defense counsel is obligated to
retain an expert to assist in determining what theory to pursue. The fact that defense counsel
hired no expert regarding the blood evidence amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel,
especially since the "blood evidence" was the very evidence used to determine Michael's
involvement in the murder.
As to Claim 7, the Trial Court held that the Appellant had failed to establish the prejudice
prong of Strickland. Id. at 20. Without restating the arguments contained herein, the Trial
Court's standard of proof was too onerous and is opposite to the holding in Sears.
The Trial Court had also erroneously based its denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion in
finding that "[b]ecause Petitioner has neither argued nor demonstrated that a hearsay exception
applies that would allow for the admissibility of Steele's and Voas's affidavits, Petitioner cannot
show that he has any basis on which to argue that Brass was ineffective in not raising either a
Brady or newly discovered evidence claim based upon Homer's statements." R p. 4896,
Memorandum Decision, /?. 55. However, the Appellant had supplemented the July 2009 Motion
to Set Aside with the Affidavits of Mr. Jeffery Homer and Mr. Les Mabry. Copies of the
Affidavits were attached as Exhibit "B" to the Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Alter,
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which had previously been filed R p 4995
Even if the Trial Court's initial decision denying Michael's Rule 60(b) Motion was
correct, the Trial Court after reviewing Michael's, Brass', Jeffrey Horner's and Les Mabrey's
affidavits should have granted Michael his Rule 60(b) relief At least, the Trial Court should
have allowed Michael to conduct discovery
4. Trail Court Failed to Address Whether or not Brass was Grossly Negligent
The Court never addressed the Appellant's claim that Mr Brass was grossly negligent as
alleged in his pursuit of the Appellant's Motion for Rule 60 Relief In Menzie, the Court held
that "relief under 60(b)(6) may also be sought where a lawyer's performance is grossly negligent
and therefore not excusable under rule 60(b)(1) " Menzies at p 515 This is important because a
claim of "grossly negligent" is not analyzed pursuant to Strickland Although the Appellant
sought relief based upon this claim, the Trial Court never analyzed this additional basis for relief
For the reasons provided herein, the Appellant has established that Brass was grossly negligent
This Court should either find that the evidence supports the proposition that Brass was grossly
negligent or remand the case to the Trial Court for the purpose of addressing whether or not the
Appellant is entitled to relief in that Brass was grossly negligent
5 Michael Mistakenly Relied on Brass' Representation
To obtain relief under 60(b)(1), a party must show that the judgment was the result of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," that the motion for relief from judgment
was timely, and that the case involves a meritorious defense or an issue worthy of adjudication
Menzies, 150 P 3d 480 (2006) As this brief indicates, Mr Brass clearly failed to investigate,
pursue and present claims supporting Michael's post-conviction relief, thus he provided
ineffective assistance of counsel and/or was grossly negligent Michael should be excused for
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his mistaken reliance on Brass to properly investigate, pursue and present all relevant claims
Clients who rely on counsel who fail to perform are entitled to relief under 60(b)(1). Michael
mistakenly relied on Brass to provide the legal representation to which he was clearly entitled.
Michael's reasonable reliance on Brass, coupled with his status as a death row inmate, explains
his inability to litigate his post-conviction relief claims himself; therefore, he qualifies for relief
under 60(b)(1). As articulated herein, Michael is entitled to Rule 60(b) relief in that he has
meritorious claims, which, if proved, would prevent the State from executing him and entitle
Michael to post-conviction relief
In Memies, the Utah Supreme Court held that "it is well established that 60(b) Motions
should be liberally granted because of the equitable nature of the rule." Id. At 502. Therefore a
district court should exercise its discretion in favor of granting relief so that a controversy can be
decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. In addressing the appropriate "reason,"
pursuant to Rule 60 (b) that applies to a Motion to Set Aside for ineffective assistance of counsel
in a post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court held "that rule 60(b)(6) applies to Memies'
arguments [that the judgment should be set aside] and therefore do not address Memies'
arguments under the other asserted subsections of rule 60(b)." Id. at 502
A "judgment entered due to attorney misconduct may be set aside under this subsection
[60(b)(1)] only if the conduct is excusable. " Memies, 150 P. 3d 507, citing Mini Spas v. Indus.
Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130. 132 (Utah 1987). The focus of the Appellant's position regarding this
aspect of the Appellant's request for relief is on the words "if the conduct is excusable." The
rule, nor this holding, does not specify whether or not the "conduct" refers to the attorney or to
the person the attorney is representing. The question then is whether the Court's analysis should
focus on Michael's conduct or Brass' conduct regarding the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. If
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the Court's focus is on Brass' conduct, a judgment under this provision should be upheld only if
"the attorney exercised 'due diligence,' defined as conduct that is consistent with the manner in
which a reasonably prudent attorney under similar circumstances would have acted

" Id

The Appellant is not arguing as to his Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief that Brass' actions were
excusable—in fact just the opposite However, Rule 60(b)(1) allows and contemplates relief if
Michael's conduct was excusable In this situation, Michael excusably relied upon Brass to
pursue his claims, but he did not Michael, although he attempted, had no means nor possessed
thefinancialresources to verify that Brass was pursuing his claims Addendum, Exhibit "29," R
5032, Affidavit of Michael Archuleta
The Trial Court in this matter found that the Appellant's Rule 60(b)(1) was untimely
See, R p 4896, at p 21

Rule 60(b)(1) does require the motion to be brought within three

months However, in this matter, the Appellant seeks relief based upon Ed Brass' negligence,
gross negligence and ineffective assistance of counsel The Appellant has presented sufficient
evidence to support such a finding regarding Mr Brass' representation Any untimeliness of
motions was not through any fault of the Appellant but because of the fault of his attorney
In State v. Johnson, 635 P 2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a
procedural mechanism to restore a right to appeal when the defendant was prevented from
bringing a timely appeal through no fault of his own The Court provided relief from ineffective
assistance of counsel by directing the defendants to file a motion for resentencing in the trial
court so that the thirty-day time period for bringing an appeal set forth in rule 4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure would begin to run anew Id at 38 Johnson was overturned in
Manning v. State, 122 P 3d 628 (Utah 2005), where the Court held
Accordingly, we hold that, upon a defendant's motion, the trial or sentencing court may
reinstate the time frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on
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facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been
unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal. Such
circumstances would include: (1) the defendant asked his or her attorney to file an appeal
but the attorney, after agreeing to file, failed to do so, see Johnson, 635 P.2d 36; (2) the
defendant diligently but futilely attempted to appeal within the statutory time frame
without fault on defendant's part, see id.; or (3) the court or the defendant's attorney failed
to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal.
Clearly, the Petitioner in this case has established that any deadline that was missed was
because of the ineffective assistance of counsel; Petitioner's untimely filing of the Rule 59 and
60 motions was not because of any fault attributed to him. Based upon the principles found
herein and on Manning, Michael is entitled to have this Court consider the Petitioner's Rule
60(b)(1) Motion.
6. Michael is Entitled to Relief because Brass Provided Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel and/or because Brass was Grossly Negligent2
In this matter, Michael is not arguing that Brass' conduct constitutes "excusable neglect"
but that "he willfully failed to comply with his most basic obligations" as articulated in the ABA
Guidelines and adopted by this Court. Id. Michael's allegations are that Brass' actions are
"inexcusable" and create "an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified
as mere 'neglect.'" Thus if this Courtfindsthat Michael is not entitled to relief pursuant to
60(b)(1) because of his reasonable reliance on Brass, Michael is entitled to relief pursuant to
60(b)(6) because Brass provided both ineffective assistance of counsel and because his actions
were grossly negligent. Memies, 150 P. 2d 515: "both grounds constitute exceptional
circumstances that warrant relief under 60(b)(6)."

2 It is important to note, that tlie Appellant is arguing both theories—that Brass was grossly negligent and also
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The same evidence and argument support both theories of relief. The
Appellant will not argue in depth both positions but adopts tlie arguments made herein under both theories. It is
important however, to note that tlie Appellant is of the opinion that tlie detennination of the whetlier or not Brass
was grossly negligent does not require tlie more stringent analysis of Strickland In other words, it is possible for
this Court to detennine that tlie Appellant has not met tlie Strickland test but has met tlie grossly negligent test.
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In Menzies, the Court found that Menzie, a death-row inmate in post-conviction relief
action, has a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court then addressed the
issue of whether Menzies' counsel had demonstrated that Brass' performance was ineffective or
grossly negligent. It is important to note that Menzies' counsel, Brass, is the same Brass who
filed the Second Amended Petition in this case and represented the Appellant in the evidentiary
hearing regarding the Second Amended Petition.
The analytical framework for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel was developed
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), wherein the Court established a two-step inquiry. A finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel performed below the standard
of a reasonably effective attorney, and second, that counsel's errors prejudiced the Defendant
from receiving a fair trial and/or sentence. As to the first prong, the Court found that ""[t]he
benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result." Menzie, 150 P. 3d at 511 quoting, Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686. As to the second prong, the Court found that "if a litigant is constructively denied
the assistance of counsel in a proceeding in which he or she is entitled to counsel, the adversary
process itself is rendered inherently unreliable, and prejudice is presumed." Menzies, 150 P.3d at
514.
In the federal context, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is premised on a
defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Strickland, 480 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, this
right is designed to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair and reliable proceeding before
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life or liberty are taken. Id at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,
482, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (noting that "the right to the effective assistance of
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair [proceeding]" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). This
fairness is "derive[d] from the adversarial nature of our justice system, which is premised on the
'well-tested principle that truth - as well as fairness - is best discovered by powerful statements
on both sides of the question.5" United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.2005)
(quotingPenson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988)); see also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (recognizing "the law's presumption that counsel will
fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions").
The Court's inquiry regarding whether Brass' performance fell "below the standard" and
whether Michael was prejudiced must be analyzed as it applies to the post-conviction relief.
After a conviction and an unsuccessful appeal, the convicted person
may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to
vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon ... ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution or based upon .. .newly
discovered material.
Utah Code Section 78-35a-104 (1996) or, as modified, Utah Code Section 78B-9-104 (1) (2008).
The Post Conviction Remedies Act also states that, in order for the Court to grant relief
from a conviction or sentence, the Appellant must establish "that there would be a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts provided in the post-conviction
proceedings, viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing." Utah
Code Annotated §78B-9-104(2). But see prior statute, Utah Code Section 78-35a-104
(i)(iv)(1996): "no reasonable trier of fact could have found the Petitioner guilty of the offense or
subject to the sentence received."
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Furthermore, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) states, in part, that a petition for post
conviction relief "shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the
conviction or sentence Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence
may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown " In other words,
petitioner is required to bring all claims and any claims not raised become barred absent showing
of good cause Accordingly, it is necessary that counsel for the Appellant, in the petition for post
conviction relief, include all claims that would attack the legality of the Appellant's conviction
and/or sentence As this Motion established, Brass failed to present evidence in support of
Michael's claims and failed to raise all claims
Brass' performance fell below the standard and amounted to gross negligence ABA
Death Penalty Guideline 10 15 1 specifically details the duties of post-conviction counsel This
guideline imposes on post-conviction counsel the duty to "fully discharge the ongoing
obligations imposed by these guidelines " Addendum, Exhibit "13," ABA Death Penalty
Guideline 10 15 1(E) (2003) One of these obligations is the duty to "maintain close contact with
the client regarding litigation developments " Id Guideline 10 15 1(E)(1) This duty is discussed
in depth in guideline 10 5, which states that counsel "should maintain close contact with the
client," guideline 10 5(A) (2003), including discussing with the client "the progress of and
prospects for the factual investigation, and what assistance the client might provide " Guideline
10 5(C)(1) Counsel should also keep the client informed of "litigation developments," guideline
10 15 1(E)(1), including "litigation deadlines and the projected schedule of case-related events,"
guideline 10 5(C)(6) The commentary to guideline 10 5 makes clear that counsel is obligated
"at every stage of the case to keep the client informed of developments and progress in the case"
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and that athe failure to maintain such a relationship is professionally irresponsible." Guideline
10.5 cmt.
In addition to the duty to communicate, guideline 10.15.1 also imposes on counsel the
duty "to continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case." Guideline
10.15.1(E)(4). Likewise, guideline 10.7 provides that "[c]ounsel at every stage have an
obligation to conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both guilt
and penalty." Guideline 10.7(A). As the commentary to guideline 10.7 notes, counsel has a
"duty to take seriously the possibility of the client's innocence, to scrutinize carefully the quality
of the state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses." Guideline 10.7
cmt. The duty to investigate extends to the penalty phase, and counsel has a "duty to investigate
and present mitigating evidence." Guideline 10.7 cmt.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (holding that counsel was ineffective for
failing to uncover and present mitigating evidence).
These parallel tracks of investigation also apply in post-conviction proceedings, where
post-conviction counsel has a duty to investigate, pursue and present "the facts underlying the
conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's performance." ABA Death
Penalty Guideline 10.15.1 cmt. Counsel also has a duty to investigate the entire case in order "to
discover mitigation that was not presented previously [and] also to identify mental health
claims." Guideline 10.15.1 cmt.
Finally, guideline 10.15.1 provides that "post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate
all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards
applicable to high quality capital defense representation." In addition, guideline 10.8 provides
that "Counsel at every stage of the case, exercising professional judgment," must "consider all
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legal claims potentially available" and "thoroughly investigate the basis for each potential claim
before reaching a conclusion as to whether it should be asserted." Guideline 10.8(A)(l)-(2).
As the Court is aware, much of the legal standard outlined above is derived directly from
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006). In
reviewing the procedural and substantive posture of this case, the undersigned took notice of the
Utah Supreme Court's findings that Brass, the attorney in question in this case, was less than
effective and grossly negligent in his representation of Menzies in his post-conviction relief
petition. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "Brass' representation in [that] case was
deplorable," id. at 495, and that his "actions were inexplicable failures...." In addition to the
Court's findings, Brass himself filed an affidavit that states that "I do not understand the complex
procedural rules governing capital cases in state and federal post-conviction...." Addendum,
Affidavit of Edward K. Brass as Exhibit "16 "
Accordingly, the undersigned viewed the work done for Michael's post conviction relief
with great skepticism. Obviously, in order to comply with the ABA Guidelines noted above the
undersigned could not, in good conscience, solely rely on the research done by prior appointed
counsel, nor pursue the same path and reargue the points which were obviously unpersuasive to
the District Court. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court's findings in Menzies, coupled with the ABA
Guidelines, clearly requires Michael's attorney to read the entire trial and appellate record in
Lance Wood's case; read the entire trial and appellate file in Michael's case; read the entire
Millard County Prosecutor's file; read the media court file which included information regarding
Chris Jorgensen; meet with Appellant constantly to keep him informed of the progress of the
case and to seek his input and approval regarding strategy; search for, locate and interview
various witnesses regarding meritorious claims, including Chris Jorgensen, Lance Wood, Gary
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Hawkins, Torin Plum, David Homer, Jeff Homer, Les Mabery, explore the need for experts, such
as blood spatter experts, and to consider and thoroughly investigate, pursue and present all
meritorious claims pursuant to post conviction relief
In the process of complying with the duties imposed by the ABA Guidelines, several
omissions and/or errors were discovered which indicated that Brass' performance fell below the
standard imposed upon counsel in capital punishment cases and/or post-conviction relief cases
In fact, it was obvious that Brass failed to properly evaluate any aspect of Michael's trial
counsel's representation, other than his presentation of mitigation testimony These omissions
and errors are enumerated herein and demonstrate that Brass provided ineffective assistance of
counsel and was grossly negligent by failing to comply with the ABA Guidelines and standards
adopted in Menzies
To assist in determining both prongs of determing ineffective assistance of counsel
(performance was below standard and prejudiced the Appellant) and whether Brass'
representation was grossly negligent, it is important to keep in mind the State's, and Michael's,
theories of the case During the trial, the State's theory of the case was that this horrendous
murder was perpetrated by both Michael and Lance Wood In essence, the State attempted to
show Michael's involvement in the murder was contrary to his testimony with evidence of the
following (1) Church's blood found on Michael's clothing, (2) testimonies of Michael, as well
as Lance Wood, (3) statements by both Michael and Lance Wood given at various times during
the investigation, (4) testimony of witnesses indicating that Michael and Wood were together on
the night of Gordon Church's death, (5) testimony of witnesses who saw them after the murder,
(6) testimony that Michael was the aggressor, and (6) the shocking nature of Gordon Church's
death The State advanced the theory that Michael was the aggressor and the more dominate
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personality between him and Lance Wood, i.e., Lance Wood was scared of Michael.
As for the defense, Michael's theory and testimony was that Lance Wood was the
aggressor and therefore more culpable for Church's murder than was Michael. Addendum,
Summary of Michael's testimony as Exhibit "18." Michael's testimony established, if believed
by the trier of fact, that he was at most an accomplice to the murder, which would make the
imposition of a death sentence disproportional to the crime committed by Michael, as well as
being disproportional to the sentence imposed in Lance Wood's case. This case contained a
substantial amount of forensic evidence. However, the only forensic evidence submitted by the
State indicating Michael's involvement was the blood found on Michael's clothing. On the other
hand, the forensic evidence demonstrating Lance Wood's involvement was extensive.
Addendum, State vs. Wood, 868 P. 2d 70 (1993), as Exhibit "17." At trial, Esplin presented no
expert testimony nor presented any witnesses (other than Michael) to support Michael's theory
or to contradict the State's theory.
Michael wrote three different letters to the Trial Court which informed the Court that
Brass was not providing effective assistance of counsel. See Addendum, February 9, 2005 letter,
as Exhibit "43", March 1, 2005 letter as Exhibit "44" and October 6, 2005 letter as Exhibit "45."
Michael expressed to the Court that Brass was not visiting with him (spent a total of half an hour
in two visits), was not keeping him informed about his case (had not sent him any papers) and
would not take his calls (Brass' secretary would just hang up when he called). Id. Michael asked
the Court to send him a docket so that he could find out what had been done on his case and also
asked the Court to call Brass and basically order him to keep Michael informed about his case.
In fact, in the March 1 letter, Michael states that Menzie told him that Mr. Brunker had stated to
the Menzie's trial court that he needed more time because he was filing a second motion to
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compel discovery in Archuleta's case. Michael expressed frustration to the Court that he did not
even know that there had been a first motion to compel. Michael was very worried that his
Petition would be dismissed because of Brass' inaction for the reasons the Petition was dismissed
by the trial court in the Memie case.
In response to Michael's letters, Brass, on or about October 26, 2005, filed a Motion
asking that he be allowed to withdraw as Michael's attorney. See Addendum, Motion for Leave
to Withdraw, as Exhibit "46." In the Motion, Brass expressed frustration and mental strain from
being exposed to the State's Motion for Sanctions. Brass' frustration and emotional strain was
exacerbated because of Michael's letters complaining about his ineffective assistance of counsel.
Brass claimed that Michael's October 26 letter placed him "in the potential position of being a
witness to contravene the statements of the letter." Id. at para. 2. Brass also complained that he
was in reality working pro bono and that he did not have the time, resources and emotional
strength to adequately represent Michael. Id. at para. 3. In fact, Brass argued that Michael's
"attack" on his office manager created a conflict of interest and was reason enough to justify his
withdrawal. Id. at para. 5. Brass continued in support of his request to withdraw by stating that
because of the emotional and financial strain caused by his representation of Michael, Michael
"would be better served by the appointment of an attorney or attorneys with the time, resource,
and staff to visit him as often as he wishes and to accept his collect calls when he desires." Id. at
para. 6. Brass filed a second Motion to Withdraw on or about March 16, 2006. See Addendum,
Motion for Leave to Withdraw, as Exhibit "47." In the second Motion, Brass reiterated the fact
that Michael's letter created a conflict of interest in that he was placed in "an ethically intolerable
position and one that prevents counsel from devoting foil attention to the issues." Id. at para. 6.
In this case before this Court, Brass filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Permit
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Withdrawal of Counsel and to Remand to the Trial Court for the Appointment of Substitute
Counsel on Appeal ("Memorandum in Support"). Addendum, Memorandum in Support, as
Exhibit 48. The following excerpts support the position that the Appellant is entitled to the relief
that he seeks in his Motion to Set Aside and/or Motion for a New Trial.
a. "Archuleta's lawyers asserted in response [to Respondent's Motion for Sanctions
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. R. 11], inter alia, that the claims which were not actively
pursued after summary judgment were left unaddressed due to lack of time and
resources." (R. 2017, 2031: uThe realities of the case and the situation required that he
attempt to prioritize the claims in terms of his focus." Id. at p. 5.
u
b. The record of this case contains numerous potential claims of deficient performance by
Brass. As is detailed in the pleadings filed in the trial court, Brass was not qualified to
represent Archuleta without co-counsel because he did not understand the complexities of
the law, as demonstrated by his affidavit to that effect filed in another capital postconviction case (R 2321, 2319-2345, 2652-59). For much of the litigation of the postconviction case in the trial court, Brass was acting alone as counsel for Archuleta (R.
1969, 2349-50, 2380, 2418), and without sufficient time and funding (R 1973-74).
Several of Archuleta's claims were not pursued by his attorneys for lack of time and
resources (R 2017, 2031). Brass did not seek additional time or funding or file an
affidavit under Utah R Civ. P. 56(f) to obtain additional time or discovery to oppose
summary judgment." Id. at p. 12-13.
c. "One of the most critical conflicts which should be explored by substitute counsel is
whether Brass' performance on Archuleta's behalf was limited to Archuleta's detriment
by Brass's apprehension that if he zealously represented Archuleta in keeping with ABA
standards and other professional norms, the Attorney General's Office would consider his
conduct sanctionable and file additional motions, which Brass would have to litigate,
again at the expense of his private practice and personal finances and life."
Brass' response not only demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel and gross
negligence, but coupled with the State's Motions for Sanctions, Brass' financial burdens, and
Michael's complaints, raised to the level of creating a conflict of interest. When counsel labors
under a conflict of interest, prejudice pursuant to the Stickland test is presumed. Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 and 369 (1980). The Trial Court, only addressing the argument that
the State's Rule 11 sanctions caused a "conflict of interest," found that the "Petitioner has not,
therefore, shown that Brass was suffering from a conflict of interest while representing Petitioner
. .. ." R. p. 4896, at p. 44. However, the Trial Court's finding completely ignores Brass' own
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comments found in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Permit Withdrawal of Counsel and
to Remand to the Trial Court for the Appointment of Substitute Counsel on Appeal where Brass
admitted a conflict of interest because of the financial burden Michael's case created and
Michael's letters in criticizing Brass' efforts in pursuing the post-conviction petition.
Addendum, Memorandum in Support, as Exhibit 48. The Trial Court also neglected to consider
the fact that the evidentiary hearing regarding the mitigation issues occurred after the State's
February 26, 2004 Motion for Sanctions. This Court should presume prejudice based upon
Brass' admission that there was a conflict of interest.
Brass' representation met the Strickland test of ineffective assistance of counsel or
constituted gross negligence by failing to comply with the ABA Guidelines as follows:
1) Brass failed to maintain contact with Michael;
2) Brass failed to discuss strategy with Michael, i.e. failed to discuss or obtain approval to
present evidence that Michael's childhood damaged him to the point that he cannot be
fixed, and that Michael would inevitably kill;
3) There is no evidence that counsel reviewed both Wood's and Michael's court files, failed
to review the prosecutor's file in both cases, and failed to review or was even aware of
the media file.
4) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present witnesses that claimed that David Homer
had recanted his testimony; that David Homer had been "planted"; and that the State had
failed to disclose reports of the interviews;
5) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present witnesses that indicated that Wood had
confessed that he had acted alone in killing Gordon Church;
6) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present mental illness issues and a possible Atkins'
claim;
7) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present evidence regarding Wood's psychological
and personality make-up;
8) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present expert witness testimony;
9) Brass lacked adequate funding and lacked co-counsel to adequate pursue Archuleta's
claims;
10) Brass was concerned about pursuing claims which might garnish the wrath of the State in
a Motion for Sanctions;
11) Brass failed to investigate, pursue and present the issues found herein.
The Respondent, which the Trial Court adopted, argued that the Appellant failed to
"prove" that he was entitled to Rule 60 relief in that he failed to establish that he was entitled to
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post-conviction relief. The response to this argument is detailed in Section A2 above and will
not be restated herein. However, the recent United States Supreme Court of Sears vs. Upton,
decided June 29, 2010, 09-8854 (FEDSC), is insightful to the issues before this Court. In Sears,
the Supreme Court was critical of the trial court's stringent analysis of the prejudice prong of the
Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel: "And more to the point,
that a theory might be reasonable, in the abstract, does not obviate the need to analyze whether
counsel's failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation before arriving at this particular
theory prejudiced Sears. The 'reasonableness' of counsel's theory was, at this stage in the
inquiry, beside the point: Sears might be prejudiced by his counsel's failures, whether his
haphazard choice was reasonable or not." The Sears Court also held that a court, to a certain
extent, is obligated to "speculate" when determining whether or not the Defendant was
prejudiced: "That same standard applies-and will necessarily require a court to 'speculate' as to
the effect of the new evidence- regardless of how much or how little . . . . evidence was
presented during the initial penalty phase."
The Sears case cannot be distinguished from this case. Clearly, Brass failed to properly
investigate and pursue the claims as identified herein that his criminal trial attorney was
ineffective. As set forth herein, the undersigned seeks to set aside the Trial Court's order
denying Michael's Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief, or allow him to open the
Second Amended Petition so that Michael can address all his claims. For the reasons stated
herein, this Court should conclude that 1) Michael justifiably relied upon Brass to pursue his
post-conviction relief; 2) that Brass failed to provide effective assistance of counsel; or 3) was
grossly negligent as provided herein.
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B. Instances Of Claims Brass failed to Investigate, Pursue or Present Which Establishes
Ineffective Assistance of Counsels
1.

Newly Discovered Evidence of Brady Violations Regarding Lance Wood's
Confessions
On or about April 21, 1989, Lance Wood contacted Chris Jorgensen of the Salt Lake

Tribune newspaper and confessed his involvement in the murder of Gordon Church. Regarding
this conversation, Lance Wood states as follows:
1. While waiting for trial from the jail, I called Marcus Taylor, my court appointed attorney,
and told him that he was fired and that I was going to take the blame for all the injuries
inflicted upon Gordon Church.
2. I was under the impression that all my phone calls were being recorded and/or listened in
on because there was no mechanism for attorney/client calls.
3. Shortly after this conversation with Marcus Taylor, about 10 or 15 minutes later, Captain
Decker brought me out of my jail cell to meet with Sheriff Ed Phillips and with the
Prosecutor, Warren Peterson.
4. My Attorney was not present for this meeting.
5. As far as I know, I nor anybody else obtained permission from Marcus Taylor to speak
with me.
6. Somehow, they were aware that I had fired my attorney.
7. At the meeting, Sheriff Phillips and Warren Peterson indicated that they had heard that I
was taking the entire blame for the murder and that I was taking the position that Mr.
Archuleta had not been involved.
8. I told them that was accurate.
9. Mr. Peterson and Sheriff Phillips then proceeded to influence me from admitting that I
had inflicted all of the injuries on Mr. Church.
10. We met for about 30 minutes and during this time, they were adamant that I should not
take the blame for what happened.
11. They were persistent in convincing me not to take the blame and only let me leave after I
agreed not to take the position that Michael had not inflicted any of the injuries.
12. They told me that they knew that Michael was involved and that it would not be right to
let him walk free.
13. Mr. Peterson and Sheriff Phillips convinced me not to take the blame.
14.1 was surprised, based upon this conversation that the State continued to seek the death
penalty against me.
3 In Section A2 of this Brief, tlie Appellant argues that tlie Trial Court applied tlie wrong standard when addressing
whether or not Michael is entitled to his Rule 60 (b) Motion. The Appellant will not set fortli this same argument as
it applies to each specific claim—but by this reference will incorporate tlie Appellant's argument the Trial Court
implemented tlie wrong standard as it applies to each specific claim. Furthermore, in Section A4 of this Brief tlie
Appellant addressed tlie Trial Court's ruling regarding the Appellant's Rule 59 Motion and tlie additional evidence
presented in Michael Archuleta's and Ed Brass* Affidavits as to each specific claim. The Appellant will not set
fortli tlie same argument here regarding each specific claim—but by this reference will incorporate the Appellant's
Rule 59 argument as it applies to each specific claim.
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15. After this meeting, I then told my girlfriend, Brenda Stapley, to get a hold of a news
reporter and to tell him that I wanted to talk to him.
16.1 told Brenda to tell him that I had something to say that would be worth his time
17. Later, Brenda gave me Mr. Jorgenson's telephone number and I called him from the jail.
18.1 represented to Mr. Jorgenson that I wanted to plead guilty to inflicting all of the injuries
to Mr. Gordon Church and that Michael did not participate in the murder.
19.1 do not recall whether or not I provided details to Mr. Jorgenson regarding the specific
acts inflicted upon Mr. Church or whether or not I simply indicated generally that I
wanted to plead guilty to inflicting all the injuries to Mr. Church.
20. Mr. Jorgenson may have asked me specifically about each injury, including the rectal
injury, and that I acknowledged affirmatively that I wanted to plead guilty to each injury.
21. None of Mike Michael's attorneys have ever contacted me to discuss any details about
this case.
Addendum as Exhibit "19."
After the conversation with Lance Wood wherein he confessed his involvement in the
murder of Gordon Church, Mr. Jorgenson called Warren Peterson, the Millard County
Prosecutor, to advise him of Wood's confession. Warren Peterson responded to Jorgenson by
stating that Wood's statements were false. Id. September 14, 1989 Ruling as Exhibit "20."
On or about June 8, 1989, the State of Utah sent a subpoena to Chris Jorgensen, which he
moved to quash. Id. as Exhibit "21." In response to Mr Jorgenson's motion to quash the
subpoena, on September 26, 1989, Judge Ballif denied the Motion and ordered Mr. Jorgenson to
surrender the tape and any transcription of the conversation to the prosecutor's office and to
submit to a deposition on October 10, 1989 Id. September 14 Order, as Exhibit "20."
There is no dispute that Mike Esplin, Michael's trial attorney, was present at all hearings
before the Court regarding the State's efforts to obtain Mr. Jorgensen's taped conversation with
Lance Wood and the efforts to quash the subpoena. However, Esplin may have missed the
significance of the confession because Warren Peterson represented to the Court that Wood's
confession to Jorgensen was that he was holding Gordon Church while Michael killed him.
Obviously, this testimony would not be beneficial to Michael's case or defense. Furthermore, it
should be remembered that Esplin was preparing for a trial that was just weeks away.
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On or about October 9, 1989, just 42 days before Michael's trial, Mr. Holman, the
attorney for Chris Jorgensen, filed with the court a Settlement Stipulation Regarding the
Subpoena for Deposition of Chris Jorgensen between Mr. Jorgensen and the prosecutor's office.
Id., letter dated October 9, 1989 as Exhibit "22." This Court should note that there was a carbon
copy of the letter sent to Warren H. Peterson. Id. However, there is no indication or proof of
service that either Mike Esplin or Marcus Taylor (counsel for Michael and Wood respectively)
were sent a copy of the Settlement Agreement.
The Settlement Agreement in pertinent part provides as follows:
"Chris Jorgensen will provide to prosecutors for the State of Utah a transcription of the
conversation conducted on or about the afternoon of April 21, 1989 between Chris
Jorgensen and an individual believed to be Lance Conway Wood and a tape recording of
that conversation."
"Jorgensen also agrees to submit to an interview by prosecutors for the State of Utah . . .
on October 11, 1989."
"The State of Utah shall not disclose the contents of the transcript or tape-recording of
the conversation between Mr. Jorgensen and Lance Conway Wood to any person or
entity except, where necessary, to the court and to counsel for the alleged perpetrators of
the homicide of Gordon Ray Church, nor shall the statements by the attorneys for the
State of Utah to counsel for Chris Jorgensen and the Kearns-Tribune Corporation
provided for in Paragraph 8 of this stipulation be disclosed except, where necessary, to
the Court."
Addendum, Settlement Agreement as Exhibit "23."
Lance Wood's confession is relevant to Michael's Rule 60(b) Motion in that Brass failed
to investigate and pursue this claim. It is relevant to this post-conyiction relief because it
demonstrates that the State failed to disclose to Michael the following: (1) that Sherriff Phillips
and Captain Decker met with Lance Wood and failed to provide a report of same to Michael; (2)
neither counsel for Lance Wood nor Michael Archuleta was a party to this agreement; (3) the
State failed to disclose to Michael what was discussed in the October 11 meeting the State had
with Jorgensen, (4) the State failed to provide a tape recording of Wood's confession and failed
to disclose a transcription of the conversation; (5) the State did not provide any tape recordings
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of Lance Wood's phone call made from the jail to Marcus Taylor wherein he indicated his desire
to confess to the murder of Gordon Church. See, Addendum, Motion for Discovery and
Supplemental Response to Motion for Discovery State's Response to the Discovery Request, as
Exhibits "24" and "25."
It is important to note that the undersigned has reviewed every box and file in the
prosecutor's office regarding both Lance Wood's and Michael's case and has not been able to
locate either the tape recording or the transcript of the conversation. Addendum, Affidavit of
James K. Slavens as Exhibit "26." It is also interesting to note that the State did not use Lance
Wood's confession as impeachment in his own trial. Id. If Lance Wood had confessed that he
held Gordon Church while Michael killed him, as Warren Peterson represented to the Court he
said, the State would certainly have used that statement to impeach Lance Wood's claim of
innocence. The fact that the state failed to impeach Lance Wood with this alleged statement
supports what Lance now states, via his affidavit, that Lance did not confess as Warren Peterson
represented; instead Wood confessed to Jorgensen, as Wood testifies, that Michael did not cause
any injuries related to Church's death.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny,
makes clear that prosecutors have a continuing constitutional duty to disclose all material
evidence that is favorable to a defendant. Clearly, the State violated this duty by failing to
disclose the above evidence to Michael. Because of that violation, Michael is entitled to a new
trial, or alternatively, to a reduced sentence of life imprisonment. See also, Tillman v. State, 128
P.3d 1123 (2005).
InStricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the United
States Supreme Court identified the three components necessary to establish a Brady
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prosecutorial misconduct claim (1) the evidence at issue is "favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching", (2) the evidence was "suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently", and (3) prejudice ensued Id. at 281-82, 119 S Ct 1936
Clearly, applying the Brady test, Wood's confession is favorable to Michael's defense
because it supports Michael's theory of the case-which he held from the beginning of the
investigation—that he did not participate in the murder but that Wood committed the murder
This evidence is "favorable to the accused" in both the guilt phase and the penalty phase
Clearly, Sheriff Phillip's meeting with Lance Wood should have been disclosed to Michael's
attorney Also, Lance Wood's conservation with Mr Jorgensen should have been disclosed to
Michael and his attorney The State's interview with Mr Jorgensen should also have been
disclosed to Michael This is true even if the State believed that Mr Wood was being deceptive
in his representations The State is obligated to disclose any and all evidence which supports
Michael's theory of the case, and then, Michael's attorney can determine how and whether to use
the evidence in support of his defense This case is replete with instances where evidence was
obtained by the State, but discarded, simply because the evidence did not "fit" the State's theory
of the case
Alternatively, even if the facts of this case do not establish a, Brady violation, Esplin
failed, if he knew, to investigate, pursue and present the matter and amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel or gross negligence Brass was ineffective and committed gross negligence
during the post-conviction relief action by not fully investigating the files and discovering
Wood's confession and bringing it before the Court Brass was also ineffective and grossly
negligent for failing to interview Lance Wood and presents his affidavit as evidence
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As the above demonstrates, Brass' performance fell "below standard" and prejudice is
presumed because of Brass' conflict of interest. Furthermore, prejudice is established because
Lance Wood's confession would have collaborated Michael's trial strategy. The Appellant has
submitted other witness statements where Wood also confessed to them. Brass failed to fully
explore and present the alleged Brady violation, or in the alternative, explore Esplin's ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding Wood's confessions. Even though Michael had informed Brass
that Wood had confessed to several individuals, Brass made no effort to interview Wood to
determine his testimony. For this reason, the Trial Court should have granted Michael's Rule 59
and Rule 60 Motions.
The Trial Court denied Michael's claim in part by finding that "Petitioner has not
demonstrated that Brass should have known in 2002 what Wood in 2009 attested were the facts
prior to Petitioner's trial concerning Wood's desire to 'plead guilty' to inflicting all of the
injuries on Church." R. p. 4896, p. 48. This statement from the Trial Court points out the
fundamental error of the Trial Court's reasoning. First, the Appellant's claim asserts a, Brady
violation in that the State never disclosed the information to Esplin, Michael's criminal trial
counsel. Michael told Brass that he wanted Brass to pursue the claim in his petition for post
conviction relief that Wood had made various confessions that Wood had perpetrated the murder.
Addendum, Exhibit "29." Brass never pursued or investigated the claim, which is the reason that
we have Wood's statement in 2009 instead of 2002. The fact that the statement in affidavit form
was finally obtained in 2009 is not justification that Brass acted effectively but instead is just the
opposite—proves he was ineffective.
The Trial Court also emphasized, to support its conclusion, a finding that "Petitioner
himself had previously stated to his fiancee, Paula Jones, that he and Petitioner were equally
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responsible for Church's death." R. 4896, p. 49, 50, 56 and 58. The Trial Court fails to cite from
the record where Michael allegedly made that statement. There is support for the proposition
that Paula Jones had testified that Michael had told her that "they" had killed Church. However,
it is a huge leap in logic to take from Paula's testimony, who was not present at the time of the
attack, that Michael may have used the word "they" in describing the death to the position that
Michael admitted that he was "equally responsible" for Gordon's death.
Regarding this claim, the Appellant has met his burden in demonstrating that he is
entitled to his Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Judge Eyre's ruling granting the State its Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2. Issues Re2arding David Homer
In support of its position that the death penalty was an appropriate sentence for Michael's
conviction, the State presented testimonial evidencefromDavid Homer ("Homer"). Homer was
a State inmate that knew Michael while they were both incarcerated in Iron County. However
David Homer happened to be incarcerated in the Millard County jail at the time Michael was
arrested for the murder of Gordon Church.
Homer testified in the penalty phase that Michael had told him that killing Gordon was
the "ultimate rush." Addendum, Exhibit "38," Criminal Trial Transcript, p. 3574 1.15-20.
Michael indicated to all his attorneys that Homer had recanted his testimony and had indicated to
them that the Sheriffs department "planted" Homer and made certain promises to him in
exchange for his testimony and cooperation. Addendum, Exhibit "29," Affidavit of Michael
Archuleta. One such person to whom Homer has stated that his testimony was false is Leslie
Mabrey, who knew both Michael and Homer.
Les Mabrey's relevant testimony is as follows:
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a

While performing my janitorial duties, I often overheard the conversations of
other inmates and law enforcers or jail personnel at locations inside and outside
the jail See Addendum, Affidavit of Les Mabrey as Exhibit "27 "
b Fellow inmate David Homer was known in the Millard County Jail as an
informant or a snitch
c On one occasion I overheard a conversation between Homer and Sheriffs Officer
Robert Dekker while Homer was washing Dekker's police care Dekker told
Homer he would "look out" for Homer when Homer went before the parole board
provided that Homer could get some dirt on Archuleta Homer agreed, stating
that he would have to be moved into Archuleta's section to accomplish the task
Homer was moved to Archuleta's section of Millard County Jail soon thereafter
d After Homer was moved to Archuleta's section, Homer told me he was gathering
data against Archuleta, and stated, "I've got a real good little thing going here "
He said he intended to use his testimony against Archuleta "to manipulate my
way out of here"
e Homer bragged that it was his testimony that had gotten Archuleta the death
penalty Homer boasted about the expression on the judge's face when Homer
told the jury that Archuleta had claimed that killing Church had been the
"ultimate rush "
f After Homer had told me about fabricating his testimony, I tried to contact
Archuleta's defense attorney, Mike Esplin, several times, but Esplin did not
respond
g Wood responded that he was not a rat but had merely done what he could to get
the best deal Wood went on to claim that it was he who struck the "fucking
homo" and then rammed a tire iron "up his ass just like he liked it " Wood went
on to say he did not know why he had killed Church but that sometimes you just
get crazy and do things by instinct
h I personally reported what Wood had said to Dekker However, Dekker told me
that his hands were tied because Wood had led authorities to Church's body,
although Dekker admitted Wood had only been trying to save his own skin
Additionally, Jeff Homer's affidavit corroborates Les Mabrey's statement that Homer
confessed that he lied during his testimony
a

b

I am the brother of David Homer, who testified at Michael Archuleta's trial
David Homer testified that while he and Archuleta were housed at the Millard
County Jail prior to Archuleta's trial, Archuleta spoke to him about the murder of
Gordon Church David Homer testified that Archuleta told him that killing
Church was "the ultimate rush "
After my brother and I were released from unrelated prison terms, we met at our
mother's house and took a drive into the canyons During this outing, my brother
told me that Archuleta had not made the statements that David Homer had
attributed to him at trial My brother told me that his testimony was a complete
fabrication He told me that he testified that Archuleta liked killing Church, but
that Archuleta never told him that
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c. Millard County Sheriffs officers intentionally put my brother into the section of
the jail with Archuleta to gather information. The law enforcement officials
wanted my brother to establish premeditation so Archuleta would get the death
penalty. It is my understanding that they had decided in advance what they
wanted my brother to say. My brother told me he was placed in there for a
specific purpose, to gather information.
d. My brother became close to Millard County Sheriffs officials and was afforded
many privileges. My brother, who was a trustee, was taken to church and school
functions and gave motivational speeches at the behest of the sheriff to groups of
teenagers. The speeches were designed to warn teens away from a life of crime.
My brother was invited to Sheriff Ed Phillips' home and ate dinner with the
sheriffs family during his incarceration in Millard County.
e. Millard County law enforcers were intent on convicting Archuleta and sentencing
him to death because the victim came from a very prominent family. Sheriffs
officials and prosecutors were close to the victim's family.
f. My brother told me that an officer named Dekker told him, "I want that
cocksucker (Archuleta) on Death Row." Further, my brother told me that Decker
had stated that he "wanted to shoot him (Archuleta) myself"
g. My brother, David Homer, believed his cooperation with law enforcers might
help him get out of prison sooner. My brother never expressed any regret for
having falsely testified against Archuleta. My brother disliked Archuleta because
he believed Archuleta was a homosexual. My borhter told me he believed
Archuleta "got what he deserved."
Addendum, Declaration of Jeff Homer, as Exhibit "28."
The evidence referenced above was discovered after Michael's conviction and sentence
to death which, if true, is very relevant on several levels. First, David Homer's testimony that
Michael told him that killing Church was the "ultimate high" may have been the very testimony
that distinguished Wood, who received a life sentence, from Michael who received the death
penalty. This newly discovered testimony in and of itself justifies setting the sentence aside.
Second, the State "planted" David Homer in Michael's cell for the purpose of interrogating him
without the aid of counsel. This act violated Michael's right to a Miranda warning and justifies
suppressing David Homer's testimony. Third, Mabrey's and Jeffrey Homer's testimonies, as .
well as the testimony of others, supports Michael's defense that Wood committed the murder.
Fourth, the State's failure to disclose the meetings with David Homer to Michael amount to a
Brady violation.
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As this Court is well aware, the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating
statements from a defendant after he has invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Maine
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 115. In United States v. Henry, a defendant awaiting trial made incriminating statements
to a fellow inmate, who was acting as a paid government informant, and who testified against the
defendant at trial. Id. The Court held that the informant's statements were inadmissible because
the government violated the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel "[b]y intentionally
creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel;' Id. at 274, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 125.
Similarly, in Maine v. Moulton, the defendant made incriminating post-indictment
statements to a co-defendant who, unbeknownst to Defendant, had made a deal with the State to
testify against the defendant and was wearing a recorder during a meeting with the Defendant.
474 U.S. 159, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481. The Court held that the government violated the Defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights by violating its "affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that
circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by counsel." Id. at 171, 88 L. Ed. at 493.
The primary concern of this line of decisions is "secret interrogation by investigatory techniques
that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 411 U.S. 436, 459,
91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 384 (1986).
Thus, if the State did in fact "plant" David Homer to obtain information from Michael,
the State violated his Sixth Amendment right because the State obtained incriminating statements
from Michael after the right to counsel had attached. If that is the case, David Homer's very
crucial testimony should have been suppressed, entitling Michael to post conviction relief
Furthermore, as indicated above, Lance Wood made the same confession at least to Mr
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Jorgensen, Gary Hawkins and Leslie Mabrey, that he acted alone in killing Church. This
evidence is crucial because Wood's confession supports Michael's trial position that Wood
inflicted all of the injuries causing the death of Gordon Church. This testimony amounts to new
evidence supporting Michael's account of what happened at Dog Valley.
Finally, if the testimony is true, Mr. Mabrey5 s and Jeffrey Homer's testimonies establish
a Brady violation. Caption Dekker should have prepared a report regarding his encounters with
David Homer, and the State should have disclosed the information to the Appellant. See Legal
Analysis regarding Brady violations found in previous Section.
Applying the facts of this case to the law above, it is clear that Brass should have taken
steps to do the following: (1) subpoena Mr Homer's parole documents to determine if Millard
County provided a "favorable" word for him; (2) subpoena the Millard County Jail records to
determine where the inmates were housed to determine if the inmate transfers supported Mr.
Mabrey's statement; (3) take the depositions of and produce David Homer, Les Mabrey, Jeff
Homer and Torin Plum as witnesses during the evidentiary hearing; (4) pursue a Brady violation
for the State not providing a report regarding Captain Dekker's contact with Mr. Homer and his
contact with Mr. Mabrey. See Exhibit "13," ABA Guidelines 10.15.1(E)(4) & 10.7.
It should be noted that Michael raised this allegation, in Issue Number 12 (d) of both the
First and Second Amended Petitions for Post Conviction Relief. The Trial Court granted
summary judgment as to this issue finding that it was procedurally barred and should have been
raised during Michael's direct appeal. However, it appears that the Court's summary judgment
order as to David Homer's testimony was an oversight. Issue 12 (d) alleges that subsequent to
David Homer's testimony and conviction of Michael and the direct appeal in this matter,
witnesses have come forward and indicated that David Homer has admitted that he committed
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perjury. This Court should overturn the Trial Court's Summary Judgment ruling as to this issue.
At least, Brass should not have allowed the claim to be lost by default.
Michael, on numerous occasions, informed his previous attorneys that several witnesses
had told him that David Homer had recanted his testimony, and Michael requested that the
attorneys find these people to verify their statements. Addendum, Affidavit of Michael
Archuleta as Exhibit "29." The fact that Mr. Brass did not explore this issue during the post
conviction relief was ineffective assistance of counsel or amounted to gross negligence. As such,
Michael should be allowed to open up this matter to explore this claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel pursuant to Rule 60 and Rule 59.
The Trial Court rejected, in part, the Appellant's Rule 60 (b) Motion as to this issue by
finding as follows:
However, in the Court's view, the mere absence of Homer's testimony, when considered in
the context of all the aggravating evidence demonstrating (1) that Petitioner was at least as
responsible for the murder of Church as was his co-defendant Wood, and (2) the utter
brutality and callousness of the murder, would not have resulted in a single juror altering his
or her sentencing decision in favor of death.
R. p. 4896 at 54.
First, as argued herein, because of Brass' conflict of interest, this Court should simply
presume prejudice. Second, the Trial Court's reasoning is in error because we actually have a
jury that was presented the same "aggravating evidence" that Wood and Archuleta were coconspirators and evidence of the "utter brutality and callousness of the murder" that found for a
life sentence instead of the death sentence. It appears that the single difference between what
was considered by the Wood jury and the Archuleta jury was Homer's testimony. The position
that "a single juror" would not have altered his/her verdict cannot be supported because we have
a jury that did just that.
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Finally, the Trial Court found that even if Michael's statements violated the protection of
Miranda, "they are admissible to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendant" Id at 54
However, this position is contrary to the law. The Trial Court relied upon Michigan v. Harvey,
494 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1990) and State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1995), to support the
proposition that any statement Michael made to David Homer could have been used for
impeachment purposes. However, the cases cited by the Trial Court do not support this
proposition. Instead, these cases stand for the proposition that voluntary statements a Defendant
makes to the police in the absence of an attorney that otherwise violates the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are admissible for impeachment purposes This case is different in that the
Miranda violation was to a jail-house snitch-not a police officer. Jail-house snitches are
notoriously unreliable, where police officers are not Even if this is not an exception to Harvey
and Troyer, the State has the burden of establishing that the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards before the testimony can be submitted. As the Petitioner has clearly
demonstrated herein, David Homer lacks any trustworthiness. Certainly, the Trial Court would
need to conduct a "trustworthy" analysis before Homer's testimony could be admitted for
impeachment purposes Without this determination, it would be inappropriate at this posture to
declare it trustworthy.
Again, in summary, Brass= performance or lack thereof is the only issue as to whether or
not Appellant is entitled to relief pursuant to the Rule 60 and 59 motions. The Appellant is not
required to prove Brady violations for the relief or that there is "newly discovered evidence"
justifying post-conviction relief for Rule 59 and 60 As the above demonstrates, the Court
should grant the Appellant his relief so that the Brady and/or newly-discovered claims can be
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pursued, discovery conducted and then the Court allowed to determine the claim based upon its
merits
3 Failure to Contact Gary Hawkins Regarding the Confession of Lance Wood
As stated herein, Michael's defense in this matter was that Mr Wood inflicted all of the
injuries causing the death of Gordon Church Michael, during the time he was represented by
Brass, informed Brass that Lance Wood had confessed to Gary Hawkins, among others as
indicated herein, that he had inflicted all of the injuries causing the death of Gordon Church
Apparently, Michael's efforts fell on deaf ears
Gary Hawkins, a former inmate at the Idaho State Prison and the Utah State Prison, has
signed an affidavit testifying as to the following
1 During, the last eighteen years I became acquainted with both Lance Wood and Michael
while incarcerated in the Idaho State Prison and the Utah State Prison
2 I first served time in the Idaho State Prison and became familiar with Lance Wood
3 Lance Wood had the reputation in the prison as being a rat or a narc
4 Lance Wood also had the reputation that he had deferred blame regarding his murder
charge to his crime partner
5 Most of the prison inmates would not associate with Lance Wood because of his
reputation
6 I did not care about the games that most of the inmates played and had no objection to
associating with Lance Wood
7 Lance Wood and I became acquainted, and I associated with him extensively
8 Lance Wood never talked to me about the actual murder act during this period of time
9 During or about June of 1991,1 was transferred to Utah State Prison
10 There I met, associated with and became acquainted with Michael
11 Michael had the reputation of being a follower
12 1 never knew Michael to ever get in trouble with the prison officers or with other
prisoners
13 Michael never discussed with me anything about the murder act
14 Michael's reputation, which was affirmed by my own observations, was that he was not
very smart
15 In or about January of 1996,1 was sent back to Idaho State Prison and became
reacquainted with Lance Wood
16 Based upon my observations and interactions with Lance Wood, there is no question in
my mind that Lance is the more resourceful of the two
17 Lance Wood bragged to me on numerous occasions about how he had outsmarted the
police by reversing his actions with that of Mike Archuleta's actions
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18. Lance Wood indicated to me that he was writing a book about the murder.
19. Based upon my observations, Lance Wood was writing a book.
20. Lance Wood indicated that in the book, his character reversed roles with the codefendant, which fooled the police.
21. Lance Wood indicated to me that he had sent the book for publishing.
22. Lance Wood indicated to me that he and his girlfriend had done acid just prior to the
murder.
23. Lance Wood on numerous occasions referred to Michael as being stupid.
24. On one occasion, Lance Wood acted out the murder for me.
25. Lance Wood demonstrated to me how he killed Gordon Church.
26. During this re-creation, Lance Wood actually demonstrated how he repeatedly swung in a
golf swing motion, a metal object at Gordon Church's head.
27.1 have been in prison for over 18 years, and during that time, I have talked to all kinds of
criminals, murderers, child molesters and etc.
28.1 have never witnessed what I observed in Lance Wood's demeanor.
29. As he was acting out the killing of Gordon Church, Lance Wood said things as if he were
actually speaking to Gordon Church.
30.1 cannot recall Lance Wood's exact words, but they were very hateful words directed
towards Gordon Church being gay and getting what he deserved.
31. Lance Wood also acted out how he shoved the tire iron up Gordon Church's anal cavity
and made the comment, as if he were actually talking to Gordon Church, "got a little
more than what you bargained for."
32. Lance Wood's facial features could not be faked but instead had the appearance as if he
had actually gone back in his mind to the time the murder was committed.
33. Lance Wood's facial features displayed pure anger and hatred.
34.1 do not recall Lance Wood ever actually said that Michael did not inflict any of the
injuries, but instead Lance Wood simply described how he had done the killing.
35. Lance Wood never described to me that Michael had inflicted any of the injuries on
Gordon Church.
36. Although Lance Wood only talked once about the actual murder, on numerous occasions,
Lance consistently described several other aspects of his involvement.
37. Lance Wood on numerous occasions bragged about how he had tricked the police into
believing that Michael had performed the acts that he had actually performed.
38. He has repeatedly stated how easy it was to trick the police.
39.1 asked Lance Wood how he could live with someone else being executed for something
that he did.
40. Lance did not respond but sat down as if it affected him.
41.1 have no reservations in testifying that of the two, Lance Wood was the leader and much
more capable of switching the roles and that Mike Archuleta lacked the sophistication in
fabricating such a story
See Addendum, Affidavit of Gary Hawkins as Exhibit "30,"
If Gary Hawkins' testimony is found to be true, it constitutes new evidence that supports
Michael's version of what happened at Dog Valley. Further, it supports Mr. Mabrey's and Mr.
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Homer's testimonies that Wood had confessed to them that he inflicted all of the injuries. It also
indicates that Mr. Wood's confession to Mr. Jorgensen not only occurred but was accurate.
Finally, it is evidence that disputes the State's case that Michael was more aggressive and the
leader between him and Wood.
The fact that Mr. Brass did not fully explore this issue during Michael's post conviction
relief petition constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, Michael's Rule 59 and 60
motions should be granted based upon Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Trial Court denied Appellant's claim taking the same position as it did on other
claims: 1) that Michael failed to present evidence that he told Brass about Gary Hawkins, R. p.
4896 at p. 56; 2) that he told Paula Jones that he was equally responsible for Church's murder,
id.; and 3) that because of the depravity of the murder, even with Mr. Hawkins' testimony a
different result could not be expected, id. at 59 As to point one, Michael's Amended Affidavit
makes it clear that he told Brass about Gary Hawkins. Addendum, Exhibit "29." As to points
two and three, see the discussion in Section 3 above, beginning on page 51, regarding Paula
Jones' testimony and whether or not a single juror would have found differently with the
additional testimony. Furthermore, Gary Hawkins' testimony, if true, substantially supports
Michael's trial and sentencing theories. Gary Hawkins' testimony constitutes new evidence that
supports Michael's version of what happened at Dog Valley. Further, it supports Mr. Mabrey's
and Mr. Homer's testimonies that Wood had confessed to them that he inflicted all of the
injuries. It also indicates that Mr. Wood's confession to Mr. Jorgensen not only occurred but
was accurate. Finally, it is evidence that disputes the State's case that Michael was the aggressor
and the leader between him and Lance. Gary Hawkins' testimony solidifies the other testimony
regarding Michael's theory of the case and supports its credibility.
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The fact that Mr Brass allowed default as to this issue ancjl did not fully explore this
claim during Michael's post conviction relief petition constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel and gross negligence As such, Michael's Rule 59 and 60 motions should be granted
based upon Brass' failure to properly investigate and present thesp claims
4. Mr. Brass' Failure to Explore Whether Michael is Exempt from the Death Penalty
Pursuant to Atkins v, Virzina* 536 U.S. 304
In support of the Second Amended Petition, Brass retained Dr Cunningham and Dr
Gummow and solicited their testimony to support the position that Michael's criminal trial
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his presentation of mitigating
circumstances Addendum, Affidavits of Dr Cunningham and Dr Gummow, as Exhibits "31"
and "32 " The retained experts focused on mitigation evidence regarding whether at "the time of
the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a
result of mental illness

" Addendum, Utah Code Section 76-3-207 as Exhibit "33 " Trial

Court rejected Brass' claim that Esplin was ineffective in presenting mitigation and held Dr
Cunningham's and Dr Gummow's testimony, in summary, contradicted Michael's trial
testimony that he did not participate in the murder In other words, Judge Eyre found that the
expert's testimony not only failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, but that it would
have been an ineffective strategy for Esplin to contradict Michaels's trial testimony by
introducing, in mitigation, that Michael's past created a person which ultimately would kill
regardless of intervention With thatfinding,the Trial Court could not grant Michael's postconviction request which faulted Esplin for not switching the strategy during the penalty phase to
a position of explaining why Michael committed a murder which he maintains he did not
commit For reasons stated herein, Brass' use and focus of these witnesses was misplaced and
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amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.,
Initially, Brass never consulted with Michael regarding implementation of a strategy
explaining why he might have brutally murdered Gordon Church when it had been Michael's
position that he did not participate in the murder, a position that he continues to maintain.
Addendum, Affidavit of Michael Archuleta as Exhibit "29." More importantly, there is a
separate basis for post conviction relief that Brass should have explored with the retained
experts. Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Gummow emphasized repeatedly during their testimony that
Michael has severe mental issues which upon proper exploration would have established the
statutory definition of mental retardation, which gives rise to an Atkins claim.
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, the United States Supreme Court found that
executing a mentally retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitutional protection against excessive punishments. The Supreme Court noted that multiple
state legislatures had barred the practice of executing mentally retarded defendants. Atkins at
313-317. The Court found that executing mentally retarded defendants did not measurably
advance either of the two main justifications for imposition of a death sentence, i.e. retribution
and deterrence. Atkins at 321; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
The court in Atkins intentionally did not provide a specific I.Q. score cut-off point for
mental retardation or even identify a particular way of making that determination. Atkins, 536
U.S. at 317. The Atkins Court's view was that the best measure of intellectual functioning
remains a matter of fact to be resolved on the trial court level, based on the evidence of each
individual case. Id.
"Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and
are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they
have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to
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abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they
are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan."
H a t 318.
Whzn Atkins was decided, the United States Supreme Court left the states to implement
the ruling as each saw fit. As would be expected, there are many different definitions of mental
retardation employed by the various states which still employ the death penalty. Some states
give specific IQ numbers which either presumptively rule in, or rule out, persons who might
qualify as mentally retarded, while some states utilize the definitions provided by professional
organizations working in the field of mental retardation.
In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Atkins, the Utah State Legislature enacted
section 77-15a-101, et. seq. in 2003 which allows a Utah defendant to seek exemption from the
death penalty if that defendant meets the definition of mental retardation in this specific statutory
context. The term "mentally retarded" is defined in section 77-15a-102 as a condition in which
an individual has
significant subaverage general intellectual functioning that results in and exists concurrently
with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in the areas of
reasoning or impulse control, or in both of these areas; and (2) the subaverage general
intellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning under
Subsection (1) are both manifested prior to age 22.
In discussions regarding this legislation and the legislature's interpretation of Atkins on the
Utah Senate floor, Senator Gladwell explained the issue with the following statement: u[w]hat
Atkins said was not so much that the mentally retarded cannot form the intent to commit a
heinous crime but that the mentally retarded are a group of unfortunate citizens who live among
us, about 1-3% who taking everything in context of where they live, [their] inability to perceive
life as we do. . . . [I]t just is simply cruel and unusual for us to execute them and the [C]ourt
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actually said this is an excessive
allowing them to be executed

an excessive application of the 8 n Amendment if we're
" Utah State Legislature General Session, S B 8 (Feb 5,

2003) (statement of Sen David Gladwell), see Tr Senate Debate at 22
The process of determining whether or not a person is mentally retarded pursuant to 7715a-102, is clearly delineated in the statute Prior to beginning that factual analysis, it is
appropriate to consider the standard of review established for this issue Utah Code Annotated
section 77-15a-104(12)(a) states that "A defendant is presumed to be not mentally retarded
unless the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, finds the defendant to be mentally retarded
The burden of proof is upon the proponent of mental retardation at the hearing " Utah Code Ann
§77-15a-104(12)(a) (2003) (emphasis added)
A preponderance of the evidence is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "that degree of
proof which is more probable than not " Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (6th ed 1990) In other
words, it is evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition
to it, it shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not Utah State Senator
David Gladwell, in discussing the preponderance of evidence standard in the transcribed
legislative history for this statute, described it as "the very lowest standard of proof, it's fifty
percent plus a penny essentially " See Tr Sen Deb at 4
Subsection (b) provides that a finding of mental retardation only operates to exempt the
person from a death sentence and not for any other purpose or adjudication See Utah Code Ann
§ 77-15a-104(12)(b) (2003) This subsection carries exceptional importance in the case at bar
"Mental retardation" in this context is not the same as the classic clinical definition used to
qualify a person, for example, seeking public benefits or services Rather, it is a more broadly
defined concept designed to include persons who might not otherwise qualify based solely on a
58

numeric score.
Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Gammo, experts retained in this matter, have both come to the
conclusion that Michael does have significant adaptive functioning difficulties in the area of
reasoning and impulse control. Michael clearly has diminished "capacity to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others." The
following are a few examples drawn from their testimony which demonstrate this fact:
1. Michael's IQ, taking into account the Flynn effect, was 71 or 72, a score within mental
retardation range. Addendum, May 17, 2006 Bench Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 211-212 as
Exhibit "34."
2. There is significant evidence in Michael's history to justify a concern about Michael's
neuropsychological functioning. Id. at p. 229.
3. A full neuropsychological assessment that included a full scale intellectual assessment to
comprehensively assess the functional adequacy of Michael's brain function. Id. 231 and 5859.
4. Michael's history clearly demonstrates that there is organic brain damage. Id. at 48.
5. Michael's history indicated that he suffered mental retardation^ Id at 93-94.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-15a-101 provides an exemption from the death penalty for
those individuals who are charged with capital offenses but who have been determined by the
trial court to be mentally retarded. This issue has not been properly addressed by the Court.
Brass provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to explore, investigate and ultimately
raise the issue of Atkins defense with the Court. The Atkins defense would not be contrary to
Michael's testimony as to what happened at Dog Valley and woul4 not characterize Michael as a
monster pre-disposed to murder. As such, Michael's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, pursuant to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b), must be granted so that Michael's Atkins claim can
be pursued.
The Trial Court found that Appellant failed to present evidence that he could meet the
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standard necessary for an Atkin 's defense. R. p. 4896 at 63. Again, the Appellant at this posture
of the case is not required to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, only that Brass
was ineffective or grossly negligent in pursuing the claim. The fact of the matter is that Brass
never retained an expert regarding the issue of whether or not Michael met the statutory
definition of "mentally retarded" found in Utah Code Section 77-15a-102. This fact constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Sears as discussed in Section A6 above.
5.

Failure to Produce Evidence Regarding Lance Wood's Personality and
Psychological Assessments.
Again, Michael's defense in this matter was that Lance Wood inflicted the injuries on

Gordon Church. The State's case was that Michael was the aggressor and controlling person in
this matter. The State presented evidence that Wood was scared of Michael and that Michael
was the leader with Wood being the follower. Esplin should have retained an expert to compare
Michael's and Lance's personality and psychological assessments. Such a comparison would
have contradicted the State's evidence and supported Michael's theory of the case. Specifically,
Esplin failed to produce evidence that:
1) Michael's IQ taking into account the Flynn effect was 71 or 72, a score within mental
retard range. See, Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. II, p. 211-212.
2) There is significant evidence in Michael's history to justify a concern about his
neuropsychological functioning. Id. at p. 229.
3) Michael's history clearly demonstrates that there is organic brain damage. Id. at 48.
4) Michael's history indicates that he suffered mental retardation. Id. at 93-94.
5) Mr. Wood had the following psychological and personality assessments: Addendum,
Department of Corrections 90-day Diagnostic Report, as Exhibit "35."
a. Dr Long's diagnostic impressions indicate "conduct disorder, socialized
aggression."
b. The "Aggression Types are characterized by a repetitive and persistent pattern
of aggressive conduct in which the rights of others are violated. This could be
through the use of physical violence of persons or property outside the home
involving confrontation with the victim."
c. Wood was characterized as follows: "Low frustration tolerance, irritability
and temper outbursts are often present."
d. Dr. Long also suggested that Lance Wood had Narcissistic Personality
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Disorder.
e. Lance Wood's total IQ was 97, much higher than Michael's I.Q of 71 or 72.
f. Lance Wood's father described him as "a con artist." He can usually get
people to do whatever he wants just by manipulation." Addendum, Lance
Wood's Presentence Report, as Exhibit "36."
Furthermore, both Michael's parents and his sister, Stella Archuleta, testified that before
Michael moved to Cedar City, Lance called them repeatedly trying to get a hold of Michael.
Addendum, Affidavit of Stella Archuleta as Exhibit "37." This evidence clearly demonstrates
that Wood was not scared of Michael as maintained by the State. Finally, Gary Hawkins, who
knew both Wood and Michael from prison, has stated that of the two, Wood is much smarter and
controlling. Wood is much more capable of formulating a plan to deceive the police.
Addendum, Affidavit of Gary Hawkins, as Exhibit "30."
Michael's trial counsel did not present any evidence regarding Lance Wood's
psychological make-up, nor compare it to Michael's make-up. Trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to rebut the State's evidence that Michael was the aggressor and
main actor in the murder. The fact that Brass did not fully explore and present this issue during
his efforts in the post conviction relief process constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and
gross negligence. As such, Michael should be allowed to open up this matter to explore the
claim in his post-conviction relief petition.
6. Failure to Obtain Experts
Michael's testimony at the trial was that Lance Wood had actually inflicted the injuries
which led to Gordon Church's death. In support of this position, and to explain the blood found
on his pants, Michael testified that the blood found was the result of carrying Gordon Church's
dead body up a hill and placing him under a tree. Michael also testified that Church's blood may
have been found on his clothing because he was close enough to Church while Wood inflicted
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the injuries. Finally, Michael testified that he was actually able to stop Wood from repeatedly
striking Church by grabbing the jack and tossing it from the scene. Addendum, Summary of
Michael's testimony, as Exhibit "18."
On the other hand, the State argued at Michael's trial and sentencing in support of the
death sentence that the charge of capital murder was justified because "the death was committed
in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must
be demonstrated by physical torture or serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the
victim before death...", Addendum, Jury Instruction No. 12, as Exhibit "39." Furthermore, the
State argued that the amount of blood found on his cloths meant that Michael had to have been
involved in Church's murder to a greater extent than as he testified. The State also produced a
blood expert who testified that Gordon Church's blood droplets covered the back of the vehicle
and interior trunk lid of the vehicle. Exhibit "38" as Criminal Trial T. p. 2732. The blood expert
testified that at the time Church was attacked, he was on the ground directly behind the vehicle's
bumper (inches) on the driver's side. Id. at 2751. This is important because the blood spatter
droplets from Gordon Church's body were towards the vehicle. No person could have safely
stood between the victim and the trunk of the car except the person committing the actual attack.
The State's blood spatter expert, Dr. Robert Bell, testified that he found blood spatter on Lance
Wood's jacket. Id. at 2757. He further testified that the "blood source [found on Wood's jacket]
would have to be slightly in front of his feet off at a distance... of anywhere from two to four
feet in front of the wearer of [Lance's jacket] and slightly to the person's left." Id. at 2761-62.
No blood spatter was found on Michael, only found on Wood. Id. at 2575-2576. A very viable
conclusion that can be made from this testimony is that Wood committed the injuries inflicted on
Church, otherwise blood spatter would have been found on Michael's clothing.
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In addition, Michael testified that he stopped Lance Wood from further striking Gordon
Church. Addendum, Summary of Michael's testimony, as Exhibit u18." The blood spatter
expert provided testimony which supports Michael's testimony as follows:
There appears to be a single, isolated drop of what appears to be blood striking the jacket
from, again, the up to down trajectory. And it appears as though it would be if you were
standing upright, it would have been coming over in this area here, to the right of the
individual. It's probably more consistent with a drop of blood as a result of parabolic
arcing."
Q: "Could it be a drop of blood falling from an instrument?"
A: "Yes."
Exhibit "38," Criminal Trial Transcript, p. 2772
This testimony supports Michael's testimony regarding his involvement and that he
stopped Wood in mid-swing when Wood was attacking Church. The weapon, car jack, was
clearly stopped while being held upwards over Wood's head allowing for a drop of blood to fall
on Wood's shirt. This particular testimony clearly supports Michael's testimony that he stopped
Wood from striking Church, either physically or by yelling,
Also in support of Michael's trial testimony, there was abundant forensic evidence that
indicated that Wood had committed the murder. For example, Church's hair was entwined in
Wood's shoelaces and that Wood's footprint matched the indentation in Church's head.
Addendum, State vs. Wood, as Exhibit "17." On the other hand, the State's forensic evidence
regarding Michael's involvement was limited to the blood found on Michael's pants.
In response to the evidence produced by the State, Michael's counsel did not produce any
expert testimony which could have established that Michael's testimony of what occurred was
credible, or even plausible. Expert testimony should have been produced to explain that the
blood on Michael's pants, was consistent with his testimony that he carried Church away from
the spot where and after the injuries to Church had been inflicted. Esplin should have retained an
expert to testify that the blood spatter found on Wood's clothes and on Wood's shoes and the
63

other forensic evidence was consistent with Wood delivering the blows to Church, that the single
drop of blood on Wood's shirt was consistent with Michael's testimony that he stopped Wood at
one point from repeatedly delivering blows to Church with the tire jack and that the blood on
Michael's pants was consistent with him carrying Church after he had been murdered.
The undersigned has retained a blood spatter expert for consultation purposes and he has
verified that Michael's testimony would support Michael's position regarding the source of
blood on his clothing and his involvement in the case. The consultant further indicated that in
1989, blood spatter expert testimony was a relatively new science. For this reason, Michael
should have retained his own expert for consultation. Finally, the consultant stated that for a
blood spatter expert, 40 hours of training is very basic. Addendum, Affidavit of James K.
Slavens, as Exhibit "26."
In another line of reasoning that Brass/Esplin should have retained an expert, if Gordon
Church was already dead or unconscious during much of the attack, the State would have failed
to establish that the death was caused in a heinous manner. Instead, the State would have only
established the crime of abuse or desecration of a dead human. See Utah Code §76-9-704.
Michael's defense should have retained an expert to review the evidence and render an opinion
as to the theory that Church was already dead or had lost feeling prior to a substantial part of the
attack. Clearly, the testimony presented at trial indicated that several of Church's injuries could
have resulted in death and/or unconsciousness. The State's witnesses testified as follows: 1)
"these injuries were crushing skull fractures," Exhibit "38" as Criminal Trial Transcript p.
3151"; 2) "so he died fairly quick from the head injuries, id. at p. 3183; 3) "In fact, not only is it
probable- or is it possible, it's probable that Church immediately lost [consciousness]; is it not?
A. yes," id. at p.3190; 4) "Now, as a result of losing consciousness, does the person also lose
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feelings? A. That's generally—you lose pain—feeling the pain, as a general rule," id. at p. 3191;
5) the State's expert would not give an opinion "whether Church lost consciousness," id. at 3201.
We do not know which injury caused the death and whether Gordon Church was dead or
unconscious during much of the attack. The State certainly had no interest in establishing that
Church may have died or lost feeling during most of the attack.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert,
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and State v. Tuttle, 780
P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), has stressed the importance of narrowing the classification of capital
cases in order to distinguish them from other ruthless, brutal murders. The initial head injuries to
Mr. Gordon Church were sufficient and probably caused him to lose consciousness at the outset.
If so, the victim would not have suffered any additional pain and suffering once he lapsed into a
state of unconsciousness. Thus, pursuant to Wood, since Gordon had lost consciousness or had
died prior to most of the attack, this case is distinguishable from other ruthless and brutal
murders.
In addition, in support of its position that the crime was committed in a heinous, cruel or
atrocious manner, the State presented evidence that Michael was involved in hooking battery
cables to Gordon Church's testicles. The State presented this evidence regarding the use of
battery cables to demonstrate that Michael attempted to "electrocute" Gordon Church. It is
important to note that hooking up battery cables to Church's testicles is the only offensive act,
testified to by Michael, that he made towards Church at Dog Valley where the murder occurred.
Addendum, Exhibit "38," Trial Transcript, p. 3269-3270. The jury should have been informed
during the guilt and penalty phase of the fact that Church could not have suffered any electrical
shock from a car battery. The vehicle would have to be running in order to produce any
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electrical charge. Addendum, Affidavit of Kevin Tracy as Exhibit "40." Furthermore, a vehicle
battery's output is only twelve (12) volts whereas a typical wall outlet in a home is one-hundred
and ten (110) volts. Twelve (12) volts is not a substantial enough electrical output to create
anything more than a slight tingle and would not cause any injury. In fact, whether the vehicle
was running at the time Michael attached battery cables to Church's testicles, or whether the
ignition was off, there would be no shock, burn or injury under either set of facts. Id
The Trial Court found that it did not believe that any expert suggested by the Appellant
would have changed the verdict in either the guilt or penalty phase. See generally R. p. 4896 at
p. 70-72. First, as argued herein, the Court applied the wrong standard; second, because of
Brass5 conflict of interest, this Court should simply presume prejudice; and third, the Trial
Court's reasoning is in error because we actually have a jury that was presented the same
"aggravating evidence" that Wood and Archuleta were co-conspirators and evidence of the "utter
brutality and callousness of the murder" that found for a life sentence instead of the death
sentence. The position that "a single juror" would not have altered his/her verdict cannot be
supported because we have a jury that did just that; impose a life sentence.
The fact that Michael's trial counsel failed to retain experts to address the above issues,
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel as was stated in Sears, supra Section A3. This is
important in that the Appellant's Motion is based upon the fact that Brass did not explore this
issue regarding experts in the Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief This again
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel or gross negligence. This Court should grant
Michael's Motion to open the Court's denial of post-conviction relief so that this issue can be
explored.
7. Mental Breakdown of State's Forensic Pathologist Amounts to Brady Violation
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Martha Kerr ("Kerr") was a Forensic Pathologist for the Utah State Crime Lab and called
by the State as an expert on the blood evidence presented at Michael's criminal trial. Her office
handled the chain of evidence, the blood typing, and more importantly the blood spatter evidence
in this case. The blood evidence was the only substantial physical/forensic evidence putting
Michael at the scene of the crime. Michael has recently discovered that Kerr experienced a
mental breakdown prior to her trial testimony. This fact was never disclosed to Michael and
amounts to a Brady violation.
The following denotes Kerr's history in regards to her mental illness:
1.
In July 1987, Kerr experienced her first of many psychiatric hospital stays.
Addendum, September 14, 1999 letter, as Exhibit "41 "
2.
In February 1988, Kerr experienced a second psychiatric episode that again
required the attention of professional mental health treatment. Id.
3.
In June 1989, Kerr resigned from the crime lab. Id.
4.
Sometime in 1989, Kerr had a major breakdown while providing a deposition by
Fred Metos, Defense Attorney in another Capital case, and required mental health treatment. Id.
5.
Kerr was taking medication to treat her mental illness. Id
6.
Kerr ultimately obtained a Worker's Comp claim based on her mental health case.
Id.
7.
Kerr is on Social Security disability based upon her diagnosis of Schizophrenia,
paranoid and other functional psychotic disorders. Id.
Kerr has stated that she feels a number of files of which she worked between 1984 and
1989 had been altered. Addendum, May 4, 2007 letter, as Exhibit "42." A letter dated April 10,
2007 from Kerr to Tom Stevenson, a Prosecuting Attorney in the Brad Perry homicide in Box
Elder, reads as follows*
"In conclusion, due to apparent technical and nontechnical forgery, falsification,
and manipulation of case log books and reports represented as those I generated during
my time with the Utah State Crime Laboratory and the destruction of crucial records for
the period of time under review by both the Laboratory and the Bureau of Criminal
Identification, specifically, the sign-in sheets for the 2nd floor Calvin L. Hampton
Complex and the Laboratory's own sign-in log, I would ask that my name be removed
from the witness list on this new evidence and case.
Furthermore, I recommend a more extensive scientific examination and
investigation should be conducted not only with the Brad Perry homicide in mind but
67

also, any others I worked on that are affected."
Kerr was the forensic blood expert in this case and testified at trial regarding the blood
evidence found at the crime scene, on the vehicle and on Wood's and Archuleta's clothes.
Addendum, Exhibit u 38.," Clearly, Kerr was under duress and under the influence of medication
because of her mental illnesses during her analysis of the evidence and during her testimony at
Michael's trial. Her statements since the trial indicates that she is of the opinion that the
evidence in this case and others were falsified and/or fabricated and needs review.
Regardless of whether Kerr is now credible or believable, the State had the obligation to
disclose to Michael that Kerr had this mental breakdown and was under the influence of
medicine. This failure amounts to a Brady violation. See discussion in Section Bl above.
The Trial Court found that "even if Kerr's testing of the blood and testimony at trial are
suspect, ultimately it was not material to the resolution of the case." R. p. 4896 at p. 73.
However, the blood evidence is very significant in deciding between the State's theory and
Michael's theory of the case. The Trial Court found, in addressing another claim, that because of
the amount of blood found on Michael's pants, he must have been an active participant in the
murder. See R. p. 4896 at p. 58: "which was in turn supported by physical evidence that
Petitioner 'had a great deal of blood on his pants,' the jury could have found Petitioner guilty
notwithstanding evidence contained in the Hawkins declaration." Quoting Archuleta, 850 P 2d at
1236. The Trial Court's position, which adopted the Respondent's position, that the blood
evidence is not important because of all the other evidence supporting the heinousness of
Church's death, succinctly demonstrates the circular nature of the State's case and the house of
cards upon which Michael's conviction and sentence rests. For example, the Trial Court found
that the Hawkin's affidavit, as well as the other witnesses' testimony regarding Wood's
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confessions, is not relevant because of the amount of blood found on Michael's pants; however,
Martha Kerr's mental breakdown is not important because the amount of blood found on
Michael's pants is not relevant; and finally that Michael did not need to retain a blood expert
"whose testimony will add little, if anything, to effective cross-examination and cogent
arguments based upon the evidence" because the blood evidence is not important. R. p. 4896 at
p. 68.
The State's Brady violation regarding the disclosure of Marth Kerr's mental breakdown
coupled with the other errors identified herein establishes that Michael is entitled to postconviction relief and/or to have the Trial Court's denial of Michael's post-conviction relief set
aside.
8. Brass9 Failure to Respond to the Sate's Motion for Summary Judgment that Claims
1-30 were Procedurally Barred Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Michael filed his First Amended Petition on or about August 11, 1994. In response, the
State filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the
District Court. However, Michael appealed the District Court's order granting summary
judgment to the Utah Supreme Court, which overturned the District Court holding that the
"district court erred in ruling that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was based on the
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, was barred." Archuleta
v.Galetka, 960 P. 2d 399 (Utah 1998). See, Addendum, Exhibit "7." When Michael filed his
Second Amended Petition, which included the same claims 1 through 30 as were presented in the
First Amended Petition, the State again moved for summary judgment, which Brass did not
oppose. The District Court, in its Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on or about
August 25, 2004, recognized that "Claims 1 through 30 in the second amended petition were all
previously raised in Appellant's first amended petition filed on August 11, 1994." Addendum,

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, as Exhibit "14." The District Court granted the
State's unopposed motion for summary judgment regarding Claims 1 through 30, holding that
"with the exception of the Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the [Utah
Supreme] Court left undisturbed Judge Davis's [district court] ruling that the other claims in the
first amended petition were procedurally barred." Id.
However, a reading of the three cases cited by the Supreme Court makes it clear that the
Trial Court misinterpreted this Court's ruling. This Court made clear in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d
873 (1990), one of the cases cited, that u[t]he doctrines of waiver and res judicata do not stand as
an unyielding bar to the litigation of claims that either once were or could have been litigated in a
prior proceeding." Id. at 875. The Court further explained that the function of a writ of habeas
corpus as a post-conviction remedy serves as a collateral attack to constitutionally flawed
convictions and that "[protection of life and liberty from unconstitutional procedures is of
greater importance than is res judicata." Id.
Certainly this Court did not intend for its silence in its ruling, reversing and remanding
the Judge Davis' summary judgment order, to be interpreted as an affirmation of the dismissal of
counts 1-30 on the grounds that such claims were waived by Michael by failing to raise them
during the direct appeal. This Court instead clearly stated that litigation of claims of
unconstitutional procedures are "of greater importance than is res judicata." Id. This language
does not imply that claims 1-30 were procedurally barred.
Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment finding that claims 1
through 30 were procedurally barred. Brass provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to defend against the State's motion for summary judgment as to Claims 1 through 30. In
addition, Brass should have reviewed and sought to reintroduce claims 1 through 30 of the
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Second Amended Petition Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15, claiming "ineffective
assistance of counsel."
9. Brass Prejudiced Michael by Introducing Prejudicial, Rather than Mitigating
Evidence.
Essentially, Brass5 approach in the Second Amended Petition boiled down to arguing that
the trial counsel should have introduced evidence that Michael's history created a monster-like
person that would inevitably kill and that Michael was damaged to the point that he cannot be
rehabilitated. As mentioned in Section 1 above, and supported by the affidavit of Michael,
Brass did not discuss with nor receive permission from Michael to pursue this strategy.
Obviously, employing a strategy during the post conviction relief appeal that is diametrically
opposed to Michael's testimony during the trial is, to say the least, ineffective and prejudicial to
Michael's interests.
Judge Eyre, in dismissing Michael's post-conviction relief, noted the contradicting
positions taken by Michael. During his criminal trial, Michael claimed he did not participate in
Church's murder. Yet the mitigation evidence indicated that because of his upbringing, he was
destined to murder. Such contradicting mitigation evidence was prejudicial to Michael and
perhaps solidified the appropriateness of the death sentence. The District Court found that
Brass' theory of mitigation at the penalty phase amounted to essentially asking the jury to find
him "less morally culpable for a murder he specifically told the jury he did not commit," and that
much of the evidence Brass contends should have been presented was tctwo-edged," that "it
would likely have been interpreted as aggravating rather than mitigating insofar as it strongly
suggests that [Michael] would be dangerous in the future. " [Emphasis added] In other words,
the argument advanced by Brass for Michael's post conviction relief was more helpful to the
State then it was to Michael.
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Brass5 actions amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and supports the Appellant's
Rule 60 and 59 Motions.
C. Cumulative Error Spanning Twenty Years Warrants Post Conviction Relief
Even if this Court finds that no single error occurred, the undersigned contends that the
trial court's errors, as well as Brass' ineffective assistance of counsel, constitute cumulative error.
In State v. Gonzales, 125 P.3d 878 (2005), the Court held that pursuant to the "cumulative error
doctrine, we will reverse only if the "cumulative effect" of the several errors undermines our
confidence . . . that a fair trial was had."
In assessing a cumulative error claim, the Court must "consider all the identified errors,
as well as any other errors [the court] assumes may have occurred," to determine if the errors
undermined confidence that the Appellant/Michael had a fair trial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted); see also, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 1993).
The errors enumerated herein certainly undermine any confidence that the
Appellant/Michael received a fair trial and/or a fair sentence. Consequently, Michael is entitled
to a post-conviction relief. In fact, the Trial Court and this Court have already held that the
following errors occurred:
(1) This Court found that the prosecutor violated his duty to engage in continuous
discovery by failing to disclose to Michael the substance of Anna Luce's testimony that he was
wearing a knife in a scabbard strapped to his right hip when she saw in the evening of the
murder. However, the Court found that this was harmless error. Utah vs. Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232, 1242.
(2) This Court also found that the trial court improperly directed verdict, in the guilt
phase, to the issue of whether or not the murder occurred in the commission of, or flight after
committing the crime of object rape. The Court indicated that even with this circumstance
eliminated, Michael's conviction of capital murder stands because the jury found three other
circumstances. Id. at 1245.
(3) This Court also found that the trial court improperly admitted evidence, in the penalty
phase, regarding object rape. The Court indicated that even with this aggravating circumstance
eliminated, Michael's conviction of capital murder stands because the remaining aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1245.
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Michael recognizes that the Court cannot reconsider the findings that the errors
enumerated above constituted harmless error as the issues have already been ruled upon on
appeal However, this Court can take into account the errors found on appeal coupled with the
errors found here in resolving the issue of whether or not Michael is entitled to his Rule 60(b)
Motion and resolving the issue of whether a single juror could possibly have changed his/her
position regarding Michael's conviction or sentence
For the reasons provided herein, and those previously adjudicated, this Court should find
cumulating error justifying Michael's Rule 60(b) Motion and also justify Post-Conviction Relief
from his conviction and death sentence
D. Lack of Competent Counsel
This Court, in Archuleta v. Galetka, 197 P 3d 650 (2008), held as follows
"We find that the unavailability of competent and willing counsel impedes prompt,
constitutionally sound resolution in capital cases, we may be forced to hold that the lack of
such counsel is sufficient grounds for outright reversal of a capital sentence and remand for
the imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parol
Id at 654
As stated above, the cumulative effect of the errors made by Michael's counsel over the
past twenty years is proof positive that Michael has not been afforded effective assistance of
counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Many, if
not all, of the errors outlined above cannot be corrected and have forever undermined any
scintilla of confidence in the fairness of Michael's trial, conviction, and sentence necessary to
impose the heaviest of all penalties - death
During the trial, Michael's counsel, Michael Esplin, was ineffective for the reasons
delineated in this motion and for those raised in the First and Second Amended Petitions for post
conviction relief Michael's second attorney, Karen Chaney suffered a nervous breakdown
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during her representation in this post conviction relief action. In fact, this Court revoked her
right to practice in Utah on a pro hoc vice status. Addendum, Various Court Documents, as
Exhibits "9," "10," "11," and "12 " Michael's third attorney, Brass, failed to provide effective
assistance of counsel for all the reasons set forth above. Previously the Supreme Court
characterized, as stated above, Brass' representation in a previous post conviction relief case as
"deplorable," and Brass himself admitted that he "had no training in federal habeas law," and
that he does "not understand the complex procedural rules governing capital cases in state and
federal post-conviction." Addendum, Affidavit of Ed Brass as Exhibit "16."
The undersigned is now Michael's fourth appointed attorney. The undersigned is
overwhelmed by the responsibility of reviewing over 20 years of representation, especially in
light of the fact that many of the files cannot be found and of which are not accounted. In
essence, the undersigned cannot imagine how this Court could find that there is any effective
means to provide meaningful representation for Michael or a review of his representation at this
point. This Court cannot have any confidence that Michael has received effective assistance of
counsel. The history of this case speaks for itself. This is such a case that this Court should hold
that the unavailability of counsel has impeded a sound resolution of this capital offense. This
lack of counsel is sufficient grounds for revoking Michael's sentence of death and imposing a
life sentence.
E. Exhaustion of State Remedies
Finally, the Court should grant Archuleta's Rule 59 and 60 motions for the purpose of
addressing all of his claims for the sake of judicial economy. As this court is well aware, the
federal courts, based on the principle of comity, will not entertain issues presented for post
conviction relief until the Appellant has exhausted his state remedies. See, Tillman v. Cook, 215
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R3d 1116(2000).
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine prevents Michael from seeking a remedy for the
claims set forth above in Federal Courts until all his claims or remedies have been exhausted in
Utah's state courts. Should this Court refuse to set aside its grant of summary judgment in this
matter to allow Michael the opportunity to amend his Petition for Post Conviction Relief to
include the above stated Brady, Atkins and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is almost
certain that the Federal Courts will remand the case to the state court for adjudication or bar
review altogether. See, 28 U.S.C. 2254; see also, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)(those
seeking collateral relief in federal court have an obligation to exhaust state remedies before
seeking relief in federal court).
The State, which the Trial Court adopted, disagrees arguing that it believes that the
federal courts will not, as a matter of federal law, allow Petitioner to return to the Utah courts to
seek relief on his claims. It asserts that his claims will not be cognizable in federal court as a
matter of federal law. R. p. 4648, Opposition at 125, citing 28 U.S.C.

T

2254(a). The State

argues that the federal courts will not reach the merits of his claims in any event because the
federal doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default would prevent it from doing so. Id. at
125-26, citing 28 U.S.C.

T

2254(b); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Gardner v.

Galetka, 568 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 2009)). Finally, it asserts that it may waive the exhaustion
requirement with respect to these claims once Petitioner files a federal habeas petition. Id. at
127, citing 28 U.S.C.

T

2254(b)(3).

The State's contentions, thus the Trial Court's ruling, based on federal law are irrelevant
for two reasons. First, they are questions of federal law, not state law, and the Trial Court had no
authority to pass on them. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (noting that whether
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to use the stay-and-abeyance procedure is within the discretion of a federal district court);
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 455 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that procedural
default is a question of federal law); Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-43 (1999) (noting
that exhaustion is a question of federal law). Second, the State=s positions are inherently
speculative. The State presumes that Petitioner's claims will reach the federal courts having
never been previously presented to the Utah state courts. But that presumption is demonstrably
untrueCPetitioner is raising them now, before the Trial Court and now this Court, in his motions
and appeal pursuant to Rules 59 and 60. This Court should not presume to predetermine how the
federal courts will apply federal exhaustion and procedural-default rules to the procedural
posture in which Petitioner is presenting his claims to this Court. Guessing how a federal court
sitting in habeas would treat a claim that has never before been presented to the state courts
cannot be considered in determining whether this Court should exercise the discretion afforded it
now pursuant to Utah state and procedure law and whether it should conduct further proceedings
as necessary to reach the merits of his claims.
To be sure, assuming that Appellant presents his Brady, Atkins, and Wiggins claims to the
federal courts in a federal habeas petition, the federal courts will have to decide whether Rules
59 and 60 are vehicles that are "available" as a matter of Utah law for presenting those claims for
adjudication on the merits. Cf. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847-48; Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F 3d 1008,
1010-11 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing State v. Sandon, 111 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989); State v.
Shattuck, 684 P 2d 154, 157 (Ariz. 1984)). Appellant submits that it would be more economical
for this Court to express a view on that question now, before he files a federal habeas petition, so
that he will not have to return to state Court to ask for its views after he has filed a federal habeas
petition. This Court would also thereby help to resolve an unsettled question of Utah procedure
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that has emerged in the wake oiMemies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P 3d 480, and provide
guidance to the federal courts that will ultimately be required to determine whether the principles
of federal-state comity that drive the exhaustion requirement will permit them to afford
Appellant merits review of his claims in that forum
In the interest of judicial economy, this Court should grant the Appellant's Rule 60 and
Rule 59 Motion for the purpose of exploring issues raised herein.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided herein, this Court should set aside the Trial Court's order
denying the relief sought in the Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief and allow
Michael to pursue the claims raised and alluded to herein, or grant him post-conviction relief,
and for any and all other relief deemed just and proper.
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